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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, a Texas woman named Marlise Muñoz suffered a sudden blood
clot in her lungs and was rushed to the hospital from her home. 1 Marlise was
fourteen weeks pregnant at the time and was later determined to be braindead. 2 Her family instructed the hospital to remove her from life support
since she had previously expressed that she did not want to be kept on life
support under any circumstances. 3 However, because the hospital discovered
the pregnancy, it refused to comply and continued to keep Marlise’s body
connected to life support machines. 4 The physicians decided to override
Marlise’s instructions and continue treating her, despite the fact that the fetus
was not yet viable and would likely have been born with birth defects if
Manny Fernandez & Erik Eckholm, Pregnant, and Forced to Stay on Life Support, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/us/pregnant-and-forced-to-stay-on-lifesupport.html [https://perma.cc/3YM9-JJJ7]; Wade Goodwyn, The Strange Case of Marlise Munoz and
John Peter Smith Hospital, NPR (Jan. 28, 2014, 5:44 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2014/01/28/267759687/the-strange-case-of-marlise-munoz-and-john-peter-smith-hospital
[https://perma.cc/PU2H-9LHC].
2
Goodwyn, supra note 1.
3
Id.
4
Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 1.
1
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brought to term. 5 Marlise’s body remained on life support for two months
until a court ordered the hospital to respect her wishes. 6
In justifying its decision, the hospital cited a Texas state statute that
voids the advance health care directives of pregnant patients and directs
physicians to maintain life-sustaining measures until the fetus is brought to
term, 7 even if a woman has clearly communicated that she does not wish to
be placed on life support upon entering a persistent vegetative state. 8
Advance health care directives are legal instruments by which a competent
person either instructs physicians to withhold medical treatment in certain
conditions where the person will be unable to make medical decisions (i.e.,
a living will) or designates a health care agent to make health care decisions
for her if she becomes unable to do so (i.e., a durable power of attorney for
health care). 9 Although Marlise did not have advance directives, the Texas
“pregnancy exclusion” law allowed the physicians to lawfully ignore the
instructions of Marlise’s husband acting as her health care agent. 10 A state
trial judge ultimately ruled that the hospital had to remove Marlise from life
support because she was brain-dead—which is a legal form of death under
Texas law 11 —and thus the life support treatment was not a “[l]ife[s]ustaining [m]easure.” 12 However, the judge made no determination about

Id.; Manny Fernandez, Judge Orders Hospital to Remove Pregnant Woman from Life Support, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Fernandez, Judge Orders], https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/
25/us/judge-orders-hospital-to-remove-life-support-from-pregnant-woman.html [https://perma.cc/U75FHMRX] (“Lawyers for Ms. Muñoz’s husband, Erick Muñoz, said they were provided with medical
records that showed the fetus was ‘distinctly abnormal’ and suffered from hydrocephalus—an
accumulation of fluid in the cavities of the brain—as well as a possible heart problem.”).
6
Id.; Judgment, Muñoz v. John Peter Smith Hospital, No. 096-270080-14, 9th Jud. District Tex.
(Jan. 24, 2014), http://thaddeuspope.com/images/MUNOZ_202053415-Judges-Order-on-MunozMatter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6B3Y-LDAP].
7
See Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 1; 2 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West
2019) (“A person may not withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this subchapter from a
pregnant patient.”).
8
See 2 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.033 (West 2019). The arguments in this Note
would apply equally to any pregnant person, regardless of gender identity. See Saru M. Matambanadzo,
Reconstructing Pregnancy, 69 SMU L. REV. 187, 197 n.56 (2016) (discussing pregnant men). However,
this Note will continue to refer to pregnant women because it is still overwhelmingly women who are
pregnant and because discussions and laws concerning reproductive rights have long assumed that only
women can become pregnant. See id. at 195–98.
9
Advance Directives: Definitions, PATIENTS RTS. COUNCIL (2013), http://www.patientsrights
council.org/site/advance-directives-definitions/ [https://perma.cc/SUL4-FMB8].
10
See Susan Donaldson James, Husband Wants Pregnant Wife off Life Support, ABC NEWS
(Dec. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/husband-pregnant-wife-off-lifesupport/story?id=21291086 [https://perma.cc/QHZ5-JGTU].
11
8 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 671.001(b) (West 2019).
12
Judgment, supra note 6.
5
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whether this Texas law was constitutional as applied to pregnant patients in
a persistent vegetative state who have previously communicated their endof-life wishes to remove life support in this condition. 13
This story sparked national conversation about the constitutional and
bioethical issues underlying state pregnancy exclusion laws that void the
advance health care directives of pregnant women being sustained through
life-support technology. 14 In addition to Texas, thirty-five other states have
similar statutes that either prohibit or greatly restrict physicians from
honoring a pregnant patient’s advance health care directives to refuse lifesustaining treatment. 15 The ethical issues these laws pose are made even
more complex today, given advances in new technology that can ventilate
and sustain the bodily functions of patients in a persistent vegetative state for
extended periods of time. 16 Technology and advanced mechanical
See id.; Fernandez, Judge Orders, supra note 5. A persistent vegetative state occurs when the
patient is only being kept alive by medical intervention due to a state of complete unresponsiveness for
more than a month to psychological and physical stimuli, with no sign of higher brain function. See Joseph
J. Fins, Brain Injury: Neuroscience and Neuroethics, HASTINGS CTR., https://thehastingscenter.
org/briefingbook/the-vegetative-and-minimally-conscious-states/ [https://perma.cc/87C2-ANHN]. In
most cases, people in a persistent vegetative state do not recover; however, in rare cases people may
slowly improve over a period of months to years. Kenneth Maiese, Vegetative State, MERCK MANUAL:
CONSUMER VERSION, https://www.merckmanuals.com/home/brain,-spinal-cord,-and-nerve-disorders/
coma-and-impaired-consciousness/vegetative-state [https://perma.cc/4DZK-4VUH].
14
See, e.g., Goodwyn, supra note 1; Malcolm Parker, Brain Death, Pregnancy and Ethics: The Case
of Marlise Munoz, CONVERSATION (Jan. 20, 2014, 10:31 PM), https://theconversation.com/brain-deathpregnancy-and-ethics-the-case-of-marlise-munoz-22076 [https://perma.cc/6QJT-KRQH]; Katherine
Taylor & Lynn Paltrow, Marlise Munoz Case Shines Light on Dehumanizing ‘Pregnancy Exclusion’
(Jan.
9,
2014,
2:35
PM),
https://rewire.news/article/
Laws,
REWIRE.NEWS
2014/01/09/marlise-munoz-case-shines-light-on-dehumanizing [https://perma.cc/GF2F-497S].
15
See infra note 56. Many litigants have attempted to challenge state pregnancy exclusion laws as
unconstitutional in state courts, but these attempts have been largely unsuccessful due to issues with injury
and standing—the women whose rights are injured as a result of these laws are unable to bring a challenge
in their incapacitated state. Cf. DiNino v. State ex rel. Gorton, 684 P.2d 1297, 1300–01 (Wash. 1984)
(declining to find Washington’s pregnancy exclusion law unconstitutional and holding patient’s action
largely unsuccessful because she was neither pregnant nor terminally ill). But see Univ. Health Servs.
Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1986) (upholding Georgia’s pregnancy
exclusion law by relying on public policy and clarifying that a woman’s right to abort a nonviable fetus
is based on the right to privacy which is extinguished upon brain death). In May 2018, four plaintiffs filed
a lawsuit in federal court in Idaho challenging the state’s pregnancy exclusion law, bringing the
underlying constitutional and bioethical issues back into the spotlight. See Complaint, Almerico v. Idaho,
No.1:18-cv-00239-EJL
(D.
Idaho
May
31,
2018),
http://docs.legalvoice.org/
Almerico_v_Idaho_Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/CDW2-SEDQ]. The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenge to Idaho’s pregnancy exclusion law on March 28, 2019, but with
leave to amend to assert an as-applied challenge. See Memorandum Decision and Order, Almerico v.
Idaho, No. 1:18-cv-00239-BLW (D. Idaho Mar. 28, 2019), https://cases.justia.com/federal/districtcourts/idaho/iddce/1:2018cv00239/41475/33/0.pdf [https://perma.cc/98P4-J4ME].
16
See Majid Esmaeilzadeh et al., One Life Ends, Another Begins: Management of a Brain-Dead
Pregnant Mother—A Systemic Review, 8 BMC MED. 74, 79–80 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3002294/pdf/1741-7015-8-74.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YTV-7PGX]
(explaining
13
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ventilators now allow for gestation in a woman’s body, even if a woman is
brain-dead. 17 According to a 2010 study, there are only thirty reported cases
where such posthumous gestation has occurred using life-support technology
thus far, with twelve viable fetuses successfully brought to term and only one
of those fetuses experiencing deformities at birth.18 Since this 2010 study,
there have only been a few additional cases in the international media where
pregnant women who are either brain-dead or in a persistent vegetative state
have successfully brought a fetus to term using advanced neonatal
technology. 19
Despite the arguable success of such technology, there is a clear tension
between state pregnancy exclusion laws and bioethical principles that
suggest physicians should respect advance health care directives, or at least
allow health care agents or family members to make final decisions based on
their understanding of the patient’s values. 20 For instance, the Committee on
Ethics of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has
stated that “[p]hysicians are encouraged to support a pregnant woman’s
autonomy and decisions whenever legally possible,” and “[t]he health care
facility should not attempt to contravene her wishes and values, whether she
voices them or they are relayed by a surrogate decision maker.” 21 When a
physician ignores the advance directives of a pregnant patient, not only does
such a decision prevent a woman from dying a natural death, but the forced
application of technology to sustain the fetus could also cause the woman’s
body to subsequently deteriorate—adding additional anguish to surviving
family and friends. 22 Pregnancy exclusion laws would thus likely force
potential technological ways to sustain fetal life in pregnant women who are brain-dead, including
mechanical respiratory ventilation, cardiovascular support and monitoring, endocrine support,
thermoregulation, warming blankets, and nutritional support).
17
Id. at 74.
18
Id. at 75–76, 79.
19
See, e.g., Czech Doctors Deliver Baby Girl 117 Days After Mother’s Brain-Death, REUTERS (Sept.
2, 2019, 9:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-birth/czech-doctors-deliver-baby-girl-117days-after-mothers-brain-death-idUSKCN1VN1HQ [https://perma.cc/QL92-2SFG]; Portugal Baby
Born to Woman Brain Dead for Three Months, BBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-europe-47741343 [https://perma.cc/LB8K-KR94]; see also Amelia McDonell-Parry,
Woman in 14-Year Coma Gives Birth in Arizona, ROLLING STONE (Jan. 23, 2019, 4:54 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/coma-birth-woman-arisona-hacienda-healthcare776902 [https://perma.cc/6CDC-CWV9].
20
See infra Part III.
21
COMM. ON ETHICS, AM. C. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. OP. NO. 617, END-OF(2015),
https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-and-Publications/Co
LIFE DECISION-MAKING
mmittee-Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/End-of-Life-Decision-Making [https://perma.cc/6QAM-57A3]
(committee opinion reaffirmed in 2018).
22
The case of Marlise Muñoz is representative of the connection between diminished brain function
and subsequent bodily deterioration. Marlise’s husband, Erick, argued that “sustaining her body
artificially amounted to ‘the cruel and obscene mutilation of a deceased body,’” and in an affidavit to the
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physicians to sustain a pregnant woman in a persistent vegetative state on
life-support technology until “she dies, the fetus dies, or she gives birth.” 23
While such cases of physicians keeping a pregnant woman on life support in
contravention of her advance health care directives are rare,24 those cases
that have occurred nevertheless raise serious concerns about whether
pregnancy exclusion statutes violate these women’s constitutional rights to
refuse lifesaving care and to terminate a nonviable pregnancy.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides general background on
advance health care directives and pregnancy exclusion laws, followed by a
survey of current state pregnancy exclusion statutes that categorizes the laws
into five different types based on restrictiveness. Building on existing
scholarship, this Note employs a new five-category typology to account for
important variations in statutory language and analyzes the constitutional
impact of pregnancy exclusion laws as they apply to all advance directives—
both living wills and the use of health care proxies. Part II then argues that
all existing pregnancy exclusion laws are unconstitutional because laws that
force physicians to void a pregnant patient’s advance directives violate a
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy under the Planned Parenthood v.
Casey “undue burden” standard. 25 Part II further argues that all state
pregnancy exclusion laws also violate an individual’s right to refuse
lifesaving medical treatment under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department

court he “said little to him was recognizable about his wife. Her bones crack when her stiff limbs move.
Her usual scent has been replaced by the ‘smell of death.’ And her once lively eyes have become
‘soulless.’” Caleb Hellerman et al., Brain-Dead Texas Woman Taken Off Ventilator, CNN
(Jan. 27, 2014, 7:26 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/01/26/health/texas-pregnant-brain-dead-woman
[https://perma.cc/P6LL-692Q]. Similar deterioration, such as wasting muscles, skin breakdown, and the
formation of ulcers can occur in pregnant women in a persistent vegetative state due to the continuation
of life-support technology. See Cheryl Arenella, Coma and Persistent Vegetative State: An Exploration
of Terms, AM. HOSPICE FOUND., https://americanhospice.org/caregiving/coma-and-persistent-vegetativestate-an-exploration-of-terms [https://perma.cc/G8BY-M6DT].
23
Elizabeth Villarreal, Pregnancy and Living Wills: A Behavioral Economic Analysis, 128 YALE L.J.
F. 1052 (Apr. 8, 2019).
24
A medical case study reports that a MEDLINE search of the terms “pregnancy” and “persistent
vegetative state” showed only twenty cases of pregnant patients in a persistent vegetative state from
December 1977 through January 2016. Matthew P. Romagano et al., Treatment of a Pregnant Patient in
a Persistent Vegetative State, 129 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 107, 108 (2017). It is unclear how many
of those cases involved physicians voiding the advance directives of pregnant patients in a persistent
vegetative state.
25
See 505 U.S. 833, 877–79 (1992) (holding the state’s interest in protecting the potential life of a
fetus does not override the right of a woman to have an abortion until after viability, and before viability
the state may only regulate that right to the extent the regulation does not pose an “undue burden” to
exercising it).
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of Health, 26 especially in cases where a woman has clearly communicated
her end-of-life wishes in the case of pregnancy. Part III argues that
pregnancy exclusion laws as they currently exist are further objectionable
because they violate basic bioethical principles by restricting the autonomy
of competent individuals to make informed decisions relating to their endof-life care. This argument is novel and will be critical if pregnancy
exclusion statutes are narrowly upheld as constitutional in the future, and it
also informs appropriate reforms to the existing laws. To conclude, Part IV
proposes reforms to state pregnancy exclusion statutes that would bring them
into compliance with both the Constitution and today’s bioethical principles.
I.

ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND PREGNANCY EXCLUSION STATUTES

Advance health care directives allow people to state their health care
treatment wishes in anticipation of being unable to make those decisions,
including their preferences to refuse or end life-sustaining medical
treatment. 27 Advance health care directives can be instructional, such as a
living will that specifies treatment preferences in certain scenarios, or can
designate a health care agent to make those decisions for the patient.28 To
create a living will, a competent person signs a witnessed directive
instructing a “physician to withhold or withdraw medical interventions”
under certain future conditions if the person is unable to make medical
decisions. 29 A living will could include instructions on “life support or
breathing machines, the denial of tube feeding, and whether or not the
individual would like her organs and tissues donated.” 30 To create a durable
health care power of attorney, a competent person signs a witnessed
document designating a proxy “to make health care decisions” for the person
if she becomes “unable to make such decisions” in the future.31 A person
may choose to execute both a living will expressing her end-of-life wishes
in specific situations, as well as a health care power of attorney to designate
a decision-making proxy for potential situations not covered in a living
will. 32
26
497 U.S. 261, 284–87 (1990) (recognizing a patient’s right to remove life support if there is “clear
and convincing evidence” of a patient’s wishes). This case prompted the creation of advance directives.
See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT prefatory note at 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994).
27
See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT §§ 2(a)–(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994).
28
See id. Advance directives can also take the form of a hybrid approach, where the patient gives
instructions for certain situations, and designates a proxy for other situations. See id. § 2(e).
29
PATIENTS RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 9.
30
Hannah Schwager, Note, The Implications of Exclusion: How Pregnancy Exclusions Deny Women
Constitutional Rights, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 595, 597 (2015).
31
PATIENTS RTS. COUNCIL, supra note 9.
32
Villarreal, supra note 23.
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When a health care proxy makes decisions on behalf of an incompetent
patient, the agent engages in substitute decision-making by speaking for the
patient—ultimately becoming the “voice of the principal.” 33 This means that
when a health care agent conveys that the wishes of a patient are to remove
lifesaving medical treatment, it is legally the patient exercising her
constitutional right. 34 Accordingly, an action that conflicts with or ignores a
proxy’s directives on behalf of a patient implicates the patient’s rights, rather
than the proxy’s secondary exercise of that right. 35 Though dependent
largely on state law, 36 a proxy is generally bound to make good-faith
decisions on behalf of the patient, and such decisions can be challenged by
individuals with standing who believe a decision is made in bad faith or is
contrary to the patient’s wishes. 37 There are a number of people who may
serve as a health care agent depending on the patient’s preferences; however,
the patient’s attending physician may not be appointed as a health care
agent. 38
In the absence of advance directives, responsibility for an incompetent
patient’s health care decisions usually falls to the patient’s spouse or next of
kin. 39 When health care agents are responsible for making end-of-life health
care decisions for an incompetent patient, state law holds them to a
“substituted judgment” standard, based on what they believe the patient
would have chosen in that situation, or a “best interests” standard, which
gives the agent more discretion to make decisions based on what they believe
is best for the patient. 40 Most courts use a “substituted judgment” standard

Wendy H. Sheinberg, In Matters of Life and Death: Do Our Clients Truly Give Informed Consent?,
71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 39 (1999).
34
See Sally J.T. Necheles, Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Despite Failure to Take Advantage
of Statutory Mechanisms, 77 C.J.S. Right to Die § 9 (2019) (explaining that a health care proxy is not the
only way for an individual to exercise his or her constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, as
the court may appoint a conservator in some scenarios).
35
Catherine J. Jones, Decisionmaking at the End of Life, 63 AM. JUR. Trials 1 §§ 32–34 (2019); see
Sheinberg, supra note 33, at 39–40.
36
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes providing for a durable power of attorney.
See Claire C. Obade, Patient Care Decision-Making: A Legal Guide for Providers § 11.2 (2018).
37
See, e.g., Sheinberg, supra note 33, at 40.
38
Jones, supra note 35, § 34.
39
Unif. Health-Care Decisions Act § 5(b) (providing that in the absence of an advance directive,
decisions are to be made by surrogates in the following order: spouse, unless legally separated; adult
child; parent; or adult sibling).
40
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest
Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739, 739–40, 742–
43 (2012) (comparing the UPC’s old best interests standard which “instructs guardians to ‘consider the
expressed desires and personal values of the ward’ when making decisions and to ‘at all times . . . act in
the ward’s best interest,’” with the UPC’s new substituted judgment standard, which requires “guardians
to consider what the incapacitated person would want”).
33
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that evaluates whether the incompetent patient would have refused lifesaving
medical treatment under the circumstances. 41 The most important
consideration is the patient’s expressed wishes before becoming
incompetent, such as any recent statements to family or friends about not
wanting “to be a vegetable” or wanting to be sustained by life support. 42
State legislatures began developing pregnancy exclusion statutes
around the 1980s in an effort to gain widespread “support for advance
directives laws.” 43 Coming on the heels of an intense abortion debate
surrounding Roe v. Wade, 44 exceptions to advance directives laws that would
protect fetuses helped make these laws more palatable to those who would
otherwise be concerned about them. 45 California was one of the first states
to pass advance directives legislation in 1976 by legalizing patients’
directives to physicians to withhold or withdraw medical treatment.46 The
ethical debate on the California Natural Death Act mainly focused on
clarifying that the right to die a natural death did not facilitate patient suicide,
allowing the potential consequences of the pregnancy exclusion to be largely
overlooked. 47 For instance, in explaining the features of the recently passed
California Natural Death Act at a medical staff conference, the author of the
legislation briefly explained that “[t]he clause that the directive could not be
effectuated if the signator were pregnant was one of the collateral ethical
issues we simply did not want to get involved in. It would have brought the
whole question of abortion into the legislative dialogue.” 48

Karl A. Menninger, Proof of Basis for Refusal or Discontinuance of Life-Sustaining Treatment on
Behalf of Incapacitated Person, 40 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 287 § 13 & n.21 (2019) (providing
examples of courts applying the substituted judgment standard).
42
Id. § 13. Courts also have evaluated other factors to infer what an incompetent patient would have
decided, such as “[t]he patient’s age[,] [t]he probable side effects of treatment[,] [t]he likelihood that the
treatment will cause suffering[,] [t]he patient’s reaction to medical treatment of others[,] [t]he patient’s
religious beliefs[, and] [t]he patient’s prognosis with and without the treatment.” Id.
43
See Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1054 (explaining that state legislatures added pregnancy exclusions
to advance directives laws to “sidestep the abortion debate”).
44
410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1054 (explaining that “limitations on advance
directives for pregnant women have been part of the contentious fight around the ethics of abortion”).
45
Fernandez & Eckholm, supra note 1.
46
CAL. ANN. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185–7195 (1976) (repealed 2000); Charles P. Sabatino,
The Evolution of Health Care Advance Planning Law and Policy, 88 MILBANK Q. 211, 213 (2010).
47
In the late 1970s, many doctors were “taught to regard death as an enemy and to do all they can to
defeat it . . . [and] [m]any regard ‘pulling the plug’ as an act akin to euthanasia, which is forbidden by
both law and the medical code.” A Life in the Balance, TIME, Nov. 3, 1975; see, e.g., California’s Natural
Death Act—Medical Staff Conference, Univ. of Cal., San Francisco, 128 W.J. MED. 318, 326 (1978) (“It
has never been labeled suicide for a patient to refuse treatment and such a decision has been invariably
respected by physicians and by the law.”).
48
Id. at 322.
41
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After the passage of advance directives legislation in California, fortyone states followed suit and adopted similar advance directives legislation
by 1986. 49 In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed whether a person has a
constitutional right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health. 50 The controversy focused on
whether the parents of Nancy Cruzan, a patient in a persistent vegetative state
caused by a car accident, could direct physicians to remove life-sustaining
treatment because Nancy would have wanted that decision. 51 The Court
assumed that a competent patient has “a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition,” and held that an incompetent
patient’s surrogates may communicate the patient’s wishes to remove
lifesaving medical treatment if they meet a high burden of proof. 52 Shortly
after Cruzan, Congress passed the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1991,
which operates as an information mandate by requiring that medical facilities
receiving Medicare or Medicaid funds inform patients of their right to
establish advance directives and comply with applicable state law governing
advance directives. 53 However, the Act does not explicitly require medical
facilities to inform pregnant patients that their advance directives may be
voided according to applicable state law. 54
Currently, only fourteen states do not have a law restricting a physician
from honoring a pregnant woman’s advance health care directives. 55 The

See Sabatino, supra note 46, at 214.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
51
Id. at 266–68.
52
Id. at 279–80. The Court noted that the majority of states would require a high burden of proof to
show that “the patient would have indeed wanted to end the life-sustaining treatment.” Schwager, supra
note 30, at 600. In this case, Missouri’s burden of proof was a “clear and convincing evidence”
requirement, and the existence of advance directives would be sufficient to meet this requirement. Cruzan,
497 U.S. at 280; Schwager, supra note 30, at 600.
53
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (2012).
54
Id.; MEGAN GREENE & LESLIE R. WOLFE, CTR. FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, PREGNANCY
EXCLUSIONS IN STATE LIVING WILL AND MEDICAL PROXY STATUTES 6 (2012), http://www.centerwo
menpolicy.org/programs/health/statepolicy/documents/REPRO_PregnancyExclusionsinStateLivingWill
andMedicalProxyStatutesMeganGreeneandLeslieR.Wolfe.pdf [https://perma.cc/384Q-74K3] (arguing
that “[o]ne of the biggest problems with pregnancy exclusions is that there is virtually no public awareness
that they even exist, in part because there is no uniformity in the way in which pregnancy exclusion
clauses are written into state statutes and they often appear under ambiguous or unrelated titles”); see also
Letter from Katherine S. Kohari, MD, Asst. Professor & Associate Medical Dir., Yale School of Med.
(Mar. 2, 2018) (writing in support of H.B. 5148).
55
As of December 2019, fourteen states do not have a “pregnancy exclusion” law: California,
Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See infra app. However, states that do not have
pregnancy exclusion laws may have “conscience clauses” in their respective advance directives
legislation, which permit physicians to opt out of withholding life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., HAW.
49
50
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remaining thirty-six states have varying types of pregnancy exclusion laws
that share one commonality in their statutes’ language: they restrict
physicians from removing life-sustaining treatment from a patient. 56
Assuming other state courts would interpret this language as the Texas state
court did in 2014, the life-sustaining treatment requirement would not
require physicians to prolong the use of artificial medical treatment to those
who are deemed brain-dead; it would, however, require a physician to
prolong treatment to patients in a persistent vegetative state, minimally
conscious state, 57 or other types of severe brain disabilities short of brain
death where removing life support is contemplated. 58 This Note focuses on
women in a persistent vegetative state.

REV. STAT. § 327E-7(e) (1999) (“A health-care provider may decline to comply with an individual
instruction or health-care decision for reasons of conscience.”).
56
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-575a (2018); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449A.451 (2018); S.C. CODE. ANN.
§ 62-5-507 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510 (2019); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-123 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-9
(2018); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (2018); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 5-603 (2018); WIS.
STAT. § 154.03 (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.8(c) (2018); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5429 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055(c)
(2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5512 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (2018); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (2019); ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2018); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 166.049 (West 2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629
(2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103 (2016); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-8(d) (West 2017); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.113 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-408 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-56 (2018); 23 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6(c) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (2019); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145B.13(3) (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10
(2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (2018).
57
See Fins, supra note 13 (“Unlike the vegetative state, [the minimally conscious state (MCS)] is a
state of consciousness. MCS patients demonstrate unequivocal, but fluctuating, evidence of awareness of
self and the environment. They may say words or phrases and gesture. They also may show evidence of
memory, attention, and intention. . . . The prognosis can be fixed or open-ended, with rare occurrences of
dramatic recoveries of emergence from MCS years and decades after injury.”).
58
See Judgment, supra note 6. While other states may not share the same interpretation of “lifesustaining treatment,” a medical ethicist who helped write the Texas law at issue in the Muñoz case stated
that the Texas court interpreted the statute correctly because the statute “applies only if the woman is
alive.” Melissa Repko, Fort Worth Hospital Withdraws Life Support for Pregnant, Brain-Dead Woman,
DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 26, 2014, 11:37 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2014/01/27/
fort-worth-hospital-withdraws-life-support-for-pregnant-brain-dead-woman [https://perma.cc/3MRD8DGC]. However, a Georgia superior court has held that a brain-dead pregnant woman could not be
removed from life support despite her husband’s wishes, reasoning that “the privacy rights of the mother
are not a factor in this case because the mother is dead . . . .” Univ. Health Servs. Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86RCCV-464, at *416–17 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1986), http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/
Univrsity_Health_v_Piazzi_Ga_Sup_1986_.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MVZ-AGY2].
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Though the constitutionality of pregnancy exclusion laws has not yet
been settled in U.S. courts, 59 it has been questioned in recent years.60 For
example, Hannah Schwager analyzed the constitutionality of pregnancy
exclusion statutes by employing the Center for Women Policy Studies’
(CWPS) 2012 study. The study categorized state pregnancy exclusion laws
into five groups based on restrictiveness: (1) the most restrictive states, (2)
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (URTIA) states that restrict
based on “probable development” of a fetus to live birth, (3) the viability
standard states, (4) the silent states, and (5) the states that explicitly explain
that a woman can specify in her advance directives her desires in the case of
pregnancy. 61 Schwager focused her analysis only on CWPS’s most
restrictive categories, arguing that states that void the advance directives of
all pregnant patients, no matter the circumstances, violate the constitutional
rights to terminate a nonviable pregnancy and to refuse lifesaving medical
treatment. 62 In her analysis, Schwager also only discussed cases where a
pregnant woman’s end-of-life wishes have been executed in living wills,
leaving a scholarly gap in how to apply these constitutional principles to
situations where a health care agent expresses a pregnant patient’s end-oflife wishes in the absence of specific advance directives. 63 Nikolas
Youngsmith, another student author who, like Schwager, focused his
analysis on the strictest form, 64 has argued that using the abortion framework
to analyze pregnancy exclusion statutes is misguided, and that pregnancy
exclusion statutes should be analyzed as an unconstitutional infringement on
the right to bodily autonomy. 65 Finally, Elizabeth Villarreal recently applied
a behavioral economic analysis to pregnancy exclusion laws to argue that
advance directives law can be drafted to “more accurately capture women’s

See supra note 15.
See, e.g., Wendy Adele Humphrey, “But I’m Brain-Dead and Pregnant”: Advance Directive
Pregnancy Exclusions and End-of-Life Wishes, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 669 (2015) (arguing
pregnancy exclusion laws implicate the rights to terminate a pregnancy and to refuse medical treatment);
Schwager, supra note 30, at 607–23 (arguing pregnancy exclusion laws implicate the right to privacy,
right to bodily integrity, gender discrimination, and potentially the Establishment Clause); Nikolas
Youngsmith, Note, The Muddled Milieu of Pregnancy Exceptions and Abortion Restrictions, 49 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 415 (2018) (arguing that pregnancy exclusion laws implicate the right to refuse
lifesaving medical treatment, and that this framework is more appropriate to challenge pregnancy
exclusion laws than the right to terminate a pregnancy); Villarreal, supra note 23 (arguing pregnancy
exclusion laws appear to violate the constitutional rights to terminate a pregnancy and refuse unwanted
medical treatment).
61
Schwager, supra note 30, at 601–07; see GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 3.
62
See Schwager, supra note 30, at 607, 614–20.
63
Id. at 597, 599.
64
Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 426.
65
Id. at 418–21, 434.
59
60
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preferences and, in the process, provide women with greater individual
autonomy.” 66
Building on this scholarship, this Note employs a new five-category
typology to analyze the constitutional impact of pregnancy exclusion laws
as they apply to all advance directives—both living wills and the use of
health care proxies. It is necessary to create a new five-category typology in
light of the complexity and variation of modern pregnancy exclusion laws,
and because some future court may determine, contra this Note’s
conclusions, that some categories of these laws are constitutional while
others are not.
Conducting an updated fifty-state survey, this Note categorizes current
pregnancy exclusion laws into five general types based on restrictiveness.
These categories reflect whether, when a pregnant patient is on life support,
the laws treat her advance directives as (1) Void Per Se; (2) Void if the Fetus
Can Develop to Birth at Some Level of Certainty; (3) Void Unless an Ethical
Condition Is Met; or (4) Void Unless the Woman Specifically States “In the
Case of Pregnancy”; the fifth category is for laws that (5) Honor Directives
if Pregnant, Unless the Fetus Is Viable. In contrast, the CWPS study cited by
Schwager grouped many states into a category called “the URTIA states,”
and the URTIA provides that “a pregnant woman be given life-sustaining
treatment if she is pregnant and if it is ‘probable’ that the fetus will develop
to the point of ‘live birth.’” 67 But this single categorization ignores important
variations of the levels of certainty required by states in what this Note calls
“Category Two” restrictions, which include not only “probable
development” to live birth, but also “possible” development, or the absence
of “reasonable medical certainty that a fetus could not be brought to term.” 68
These additional two levels of certainty are much broader than the URTIA’s
term “probable,” and lead to important analytical outcomes when evaluating
the constitutional effect of this language. 69 The CWPS study also includes
states such as New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and South
Dakota in “the URTIA states,” even though these states make certain
exceptions based on physical harm to the woman or “severe pain which
cannot be alleviated by medication.” 70 These states warrant their own
category because they attempt to balance the rights of the woman and fetus
in a way that is constitutionally problematic.71 This Part proceeds to explain
66
67
68
69
70
71

Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1052.
GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 3–4.
See infra Section I.B.
See infra Section II.A.2.
GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 4.
See infra Section I.C.
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each of this Note’s five categories of pregnancy exclusion laws in further
detail.
A. Category One: Void Per Se
As of December 2019, there are ten states that void a pregnant woman’s
advance health care directives “per se” in all circumstances, no matter how
far along the fetus is, whether it would cause the woman pain or harm, or
whether the fetus could be brought to term without complications or
deformities. 72 This category constitutes the most restrictive and
constitutionally suspect type of pregnancy exclusion law out of all five
categories. Category One laws prohibit a physician from removing life
support from a pregnant woman despite a clear statement in her advance
directives that that is what she wants—even if that woman directed that her
end-of-life preferences would not change in the case of pregnancy. 73
B. Category Two: Void if the Fetus Can Develop to Birth at
Some Level of Certainty
Eleven states void a pregnant woman’s advance health care directives
based on three different levels of knowledge the physician has about whether
the fetus can potentially develop to live birth: (1) “probable,” (2) “possible,”
or (3) unless there is “reasonable medical certainty” that the fetus cannot be
72
Those states are Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, and Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2018) (“The advance directive for health care of a
declarant who is known by the attending physician to be pregnant shall have no effect during the course
of the declarant’s pregnancy.”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510 (2018) (“If I have been diagnosed as
pregnant, this Directive shall have no force during the course of my pregnancy.”); IND. CODE § 16-36-48(d) (West 2017) (“The living will declaration of a person diagnosed as pregnant by the attending
physician has no effect during the person’s pregnancy.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103 (2016) (“The
declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant by the attending physician shall have no effect
during the course of the qualified patient’s pregnancy.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 700.5512(1) (2018) (“A
patient advocate cannot make a medical treatment decision . . . to withhold or withdraw treatment from a
pregnant patient that would result in the pregnant patient’s death.”); MO. ANN. STAT.§ 459.025 (2018)
(“The declaration to withdraw or withhold treatment by a patient diagnosed as pregnant by the attending
physician shall have no effect during the course of the declarant’s pregnancy.”); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 625-507 (2018) (“If a principal has been diagnosed as pregnant, life-sustaining procedures may not be
withheld or withdrawn pursuant to the health care power of attorney during the course of the principal’s
pregnancy.”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2019) (“A person may not withdraw
or withhold life-sustaining treatment under this subchapter from a pregnant patient.”); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2a-123(1) (2018) (“A health care directive that provides for the withholding or withdrawal of life
sustaining procedures has no force during the course of a declarant’s pregnancy.”); WIS. STAT.
§ 154.03(2) (2018) (“If you know that the patient is pregnant, this document [DECLARATION TO
PHYSICIANS] has no effect during her pregnancy.”).
73
See Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1059 (explaining that laws that “automatically invalidate a
woman’s living will . . . are indifferent to whether the living will was created prior to or during a
pregnancy, or whether the will specifically contemplates the possibility that the writer may become
pregnant”).
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born. 74 Six states void a pregnant woman’s advance directives if a physician
determines it is “probable” the fetus can develop to live birth or viability, 75
while four do so if a physician determines it is “possible.” 76 Ohio voids a
pregnant woman’s advance directives unless there is a “reasonable degree of
medical certainty . . . that the fetus would not be born alive.” 77 Under any of
these state laws, if a physician finds that the required level of certainty of a
74
Those states are Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, Ohio, and Rhode Island. Of these three sub-categories, “probable” is the least restrictive and
“reasonable medical certainty” is the most restrictive.
75
Importantly, Alaska and Delaware’s pregnancy exclusion statutes contain the permissive language
“may not be given effect,” instead of the more standard mandatory language of “cannot,” “shall not,” and
“shall be given no force” contained in the pregnancy exclusion statutes of Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
and Rhode Island. It is ambiguous whether the apparently permissive language would be interpreted as
to allow hospitals to void a pregnant woman’s advance directives, rather than require hospitals to void
them, as in the states with mandatory language. Compare ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055(b) (2018)
(“[A]n advance health care directive by a patient or a decision by the person then authorized to make
health care decisions for a patient may not be given effect if[:] (1) the patient is a woman who is pregnant
and lacks capacity . . . [and] it is probable that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth if the lifesustaining procedures were provided.”), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (2018) (“A life-sustaining
procedure may not be withheld or withdrawn from a patient known to be pregnant, so long as it is probable
that the fetus will develop to be viable outside the uterus with the continued application of a life-sustaining
procedure.”), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (2019) (“Life-sustaining treatment cannot be
withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an individual known to the attending
physician . . . to be pregnant so long as it is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth
with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”), NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-408(3) (2018)
(“Life-sustaining treatment shall not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant to a declaration from an
individual known to the attending physician to be pregnant so long as it is probable that the fetus will
develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”), NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449A.451 (2018) (“Life-sustaining treatment must not be withheld or withdrawn pursuant
to a declaration from a qualified patient known to the attending physician . . . to be pregnant so long as it
is probable that the fetus will develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining
treatment.”), and 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6(c) (2018) (“The declaration of a qualified patient
known to the attending physician to be pregnant shall be given no force or effect as long as it is probable
that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life sustaining
procedures.”).
76
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (2018) (“The declaration of a qualified patient known to the
attending physician to be pregnant must not be given effect as long as it is possible that the fetus could
develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (2018) (“The declaration of a qualified patient diagnosed as pregnant by the
attending physician shall be given no force and effect as long as in the opinion of the attending physician
it is possible that the fetus could develop to the point of live birth with the continued application of death
delaying procedures.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (2018) (“The declaration of a qualified patient known
to the attending physician to be pregnant shall not be in effect as long as the fetus could develop to the
point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining procedures.”); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145B.13(3) (2019) (“[T]he living will must not be given effect as long as it is possible that the fetus
could develop to the point of live birth with continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”).
77
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (2018) (“Life-sustaining treatment shall not be withheld or
withdrawn from a declarant . . . if the declarant is pregnant . . . unless the declarant’s attending physician
and one other physician . . . determine, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . that the fetus would
not be born alive.”).
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live birth or viability is met, then the physician is required to void the
woman’s advance health care directives (or, in the cases of Alaska and
Delaware, they are at least enabled to)—even if the woman clearly stated
that her end-of-life preferences would not change in the case of pregnancy. 78
C. Category Three: Void Unless an Ethical Condition Is Met
Five states currently void a pregnant woman’s advance directives based
on the existence of at least one condition that takes into account potential
health consequences to the pregnant woman or the chance the fetus could
develop to term. Kentucky voids a pregnant woman’s advance directives
unless treatment (1) will not permit live birth, (2) “will be physically harmful
to the woman,” or (3) will “prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated
by medication.” 79 Similarly, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and South
Dakota void a pregnant woman’s advance directives unless (1) the fetus will
not develop to live birth, (2) treatment will be “physically harmful” or
“unreasonably painful” to the woman, or (3) treatment will “prolong severe
pain that cannot be alleviated by medication.” 80 Lastly, Pennsylvania’s

78
See GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 4 (explaining that the URTIA originally included the
phrase “unless the declaration otherwise provides,” but this phrase was ultimately removed from its final
form—ensuring that advance directives would still be voided “regardless of the woman’s expressed
desires to the contrary”).
79
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629(4) (2018) (“Notwithstanding the execution of an advance
directive, life sustaining treatment and artificially-provided nutrition and hydration shall be provided to
a pregnant woman unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as certified on the woman’s
medical chart by the attending physician and one (1) other physician who has examined the woman, the
procedures will not maintain the woman in a way to permit the continuing development and live birth of
the unborn child, will be physically harmful to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be
alleviated by medication.”).
80
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone,
authorize, or approve: (a) The consent to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant
principal, unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, . . . such treatment or procedures will not
maintain the principal in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the fetus
or will be physically harmful to the principal or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by
medication.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017) (“Notwithstanding a contrary direction
contained in a health care directive executed under this chapter, health care must be provided to a pregnant
principal unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . such health care will not maintain the
principal in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will
be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to the principal or will prolong severe pain that cannot be
alleviated by medication.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 (2018) (“Notwithstanding a declaration
made pursuant to this chapter, life-sustaining treatment and artificial nutrition and hydration shall be
provided to a pregnant woman unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, . . . such procedures
will not maintain the woman in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the
unborn child or will be physically harmful to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated
by medication.”).
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statute is similar to these with an additional requirement honoring a woman’s
advance directive if it is probable the fetus cannot be brought to a live birth.81
Based on the language used in the state statute variations, physicians
hold great power over whether they will choose to honor or void a pregnant
woman’s advance directives due to the medical determinations required to
apply the statute, and must only take the above considerations into account.
This is because “[n]o doctor, judge or legislative body can possibly
determine with any certainty when a fetus has reached a point in
development at which it will ‘probably’ reach live birth.” 82
Furthermore, anecdotal evidence suggests that physicians experience
confusion on exactly what the law requires when treating pregnant patients
in a persistent vegetative state. For example, there has been at least one case
where Pennsylvania physicians rejected a family’s requests to remove
lifesaving treatment from a pregnant patient in a persistent vegetative state. 83
The physicians there cited the Pennsylvania law to justify continued
treatment, though they disagreed about the right thing to do. 84 The physicians
acknowledged the great weight of the decision they were forced to make
under the law, and reported that there were “strongly held differences of
opinion among the caregivers”—some feeling “uncomfortable with the
decision to maintain [the] patient on artificial nutrition and a ventilator” and
some feeling “her family’s initial request to withdraw life support should
have been honored.” 85
D. Category Four: Void Unless the Woman Specifically
States “In the Case of Pregnancy”
Nine states provide a clear option for a woman to state in advance health
care directives what her wish would be in the case of pregnancy. 86 These
20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5429(a)(2018) (“Notwithstanding the existence of a living
will, a health care decision by a health care representative or health care agent or any other direction to
the contrary, life-sustaining treatment, nutrition and hydration shall be provided to a pregnant woman
who is incompetent and has an end-stage medical condition or who is permanently unconscious unless,
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . life-sustaining treatment, nutrition and hydration: (1) will
not maintain the pregnant woman in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth
of the unborn child; (2) will be physically harmful to the pregnant woman; or (3) will cause pain to the
pregnant woman that cannot be alleviated by medication.”).
82
GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 6.
83
See Romagano et al., supra note 24, at 107, 110.
84
See id.; 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5429.
85
Romagano et al., supra note 24, at 110.
86
Those states are Arizona, Florida, Oklahoma, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey,
Vermont, and Washington. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (2018)
(“Notwithstanding my other directions, if I am known to be pregnant, I do not want life-sustaining
treatment withheld or withdrawn if it is possible that the embryo/fetus will develop to the point of live
81
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types of laws may still void a pregnant woman’s advance health care
directives that direct a physician to remove life-sustaining treatment if there
is no specification in her advance directives about how those preferences
would change in the case of pregnancy. 87 Furthermore, in the absence of
advance directives, these types of laws may also prohibit a physician from
honoring the decision of a pregnant woman’s health care agent to remove
life support, even if the fetus is not viable. 88
E. Category Five: Honor if Pregnant, Unless the Fetus Is Viable
Colorado is the only state with a pregnancy exclusion statute that honors
a pregnant woman’s advance health care directives to remove life-sustaining
treatment before viability, even if the woman does not state specifically if
her preferences would change in the case of pregnancy. 89 Under Colorado’s
statute, a physician must honor a woman’s advance directives to remove lifesustaining treatment if the fetus is not yet viable and must void a woman’s
advance directives if the fetus is viable. 90 This law also allows physicians to
honor the decisions of a health care agent in the absence of advance
directives as long as this decision is made prior to fetal viability. 91
Furthermore, this law should not allow physicians to honor a health care
agent’s request to maintain life support of a pregnant woman pre-viability if
the woman had advance directives directing removal of life support. 92 This
could potentially place physicians in an uncomfortable position if there is
birth with the continued application of life-sustaining treatment.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.8(c)
(2018) (“[T]he pregnant patient shall be provided with life-sustaining treatment and artificially
administered hydration and nutrition, unless the patient has specifically authorized, in her own words,
that during a course of pregnancy, life-sustaining treatment and/or artificially administered hydration
and/or nutrition shall be withheld or withdrawn.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-575a (2018); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-32-9 (2018); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 5-603 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H56 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702 (2018); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (2019).
87
See statutes cited supra note 86. Arizona does not automatically void a pregnant woman’s advance
health care directive if there is no specification about how her preferences would change in the case of
pregnancy, but rather may void a directive if it is “possible that the embryo/fetus will develop to the point
of live birth with the continued application of life-sustaining treatment.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 363262 (2018).
88
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (“Unless the principal expressly delegates such authority to
the surrogate in writing, or a surrogate or proxy has sought and received court approval . . . a surrogate
or proxy may not provide consent for . . . [w]ithholding or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures from
a pregnant patient prior to viability . . . .”).
89
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (2018) (“In the case of a declaration of a qualified patient
known to the attending physician to be pregnant, a medical evaluation shall be made as to whether the
fetus is viable. If the fetus is viable, the declaration shall be given no force or effect until the patient is no
longer pregnant.”).
90
Id.
91
See id. §§ 15-18-104(1)–(2).
92
See id.
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compelling evidence that the woman would have changed her mind and
wanted to sustain the fetus to birth. 93
II. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE PREGNANCY
EXCLUSION STATUTES
The five categories of state pregnancy exclusion laws described above
raise substantial concerns when analyzed in light of a woman’s constitutional
right to decide not to continue a pregnancy and to refuse lifesaving medical
treatment. 94 This Part argues that all categories of pregnancy exclusion laws
that void a woman’s advance directives or her health care agent’s directives
to remove life support before fetal viability are unconstitutional under the
Planned Parenthood v. Casey “undue burden” framework. 95 Furthermore,
such statutes violate the constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment under Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health. 96 Part II provides an overview of the constitutional rights articulated
in Casey and Cruzan, and applies those frameworks to all five categories of
pregnancy exclusion statutes.
A. Right to Terminate a Pregnancy
First, it is appropriate to analyze pregnancy exclusion statutes under an
abortion restriction framework because pregnancy exclusion laws are
“driven by a desire on the part of state governments to ensure, to the extent
legally possible, that pregnant women carry their fetuses to term.” 97
Similarly, pregnancy exclusion statutes show a preference for bringing the
fetus to term over the right of the pregnant woman to refuse unwanted
medical treatment, suggesting the laws are guided by the same motivation to

93
However, an argument could be made that the advance directive is maximally reflective of her
wishes. See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text.
94
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S 261 (1990).
95
Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
96
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286–87. State constitutions may be even more protective of these rights than
the U.S. Constitution because many states explicitly protect a “privacy” right, unlike the U.S.
Constitution, in which the right to privacy is not an explicit right but is derived from a substantive due
process theory. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–47; infra note 111; Privacy Protections in State Constitutions,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2YG7-G7JL] (“Constitutions in 11 states—Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Washington—have explicit
provisions relating to a right to privacy.”). However, this analysis is outside the scope of this Note.
97
Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 419; Schwager, supra note 30, at 614 (arguing pregnancy exclusion
statutes “violate the female patient’s right to abortion, especially those statutes which automatically
invalidate a woman’s advance directive upon a pregnancy diagnosis”).
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protect the “potentiality of life.” 98 Because most pregnancy exclusion laws
void the advance directives of all pregnant women, even if they stated their
wishes would not change in the case of pregnancy, it is evident that
“accurately capturing a woman’s preferences cannot be legislators’ only
concern.” 99
However, one can question whether the abortion restriction framework
appropriately applies to pregnancy exclusion statutes because there are some
fundamental differences between abortion restriction laws and pregnancy
exclusion laws. For instance, Youngsmith argues that analyzing pregnancy
exclusion statutes as a violation of the right to terminate a nonviable
pregnancy is misguided because “those who would seek to have a pregnant
woman’s advance directive enforced are not seeking an abortion of the fetus,
but rather seeking the proper administration of that woman’s choice of her
own end-of-life care.” 100 One important distinction between pregnancy
exclusion statutes and abortion restrictions is that “abortion restrictions stop
women from getting the health care that they want or need; [but] pregnancy
exceptions forcibly subject women to health care that they neither require
nor desire.” 101 The enforcement of advance directives functionally ends a
pregnancy as a byproduct of dying a natural death; however, a woman is not
so much deciding that she affirmatively wants to abort the fetus as she is
deciding she does not want to artificially have her body be kept alive for use
as an incubator. 102 These types of scenarios were undoubtedly not
contemplated when Roe and Casey were decided, and this Note does not
argue that pregnant women in persistent vegetative states are fundamentally
the same as pregnant women who want to seek abortions. 103
Nonetheless, pregnancy exclusion statutes should still be analyzed
under Casey, along with Cruzan, because the Court instructed that laws
aimed at protecting the future life of a fetus must be balanced against the
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1054.
100
Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 418.
101
Id. at 419, 439 (arguing pregnancy exclusion statutes “reach beyond abortion regulations, legally
forcing women to essentially act as hosts, supporting a fetus which would not survive without modern
medicine”).
102
Id.
103
Id. Youngsmith also notes that the abortion restriction framework actually “provides for
significant limitations on the autonomy rights of pregnant women” compared to the right to refuse
lifesaving medical treatment because “[i]f [only] the rules of the abortion cases apply to advance
directives, then incompetent pregnant women face a built-in—and misapplied—set of rights restrictions,
carved out over time by Roe, Casey, and other cases.” Id. at 448. For this reason, the arguments advanced
in Section II.B of this Note regarding the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment are less controversial
than the arguments regarding the right to terminate a nonviable pregnancy, and thus may be more useful
to any constitutional challenge of pregnancy exclusion laws.
98
99
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burden placed on the mother. 104 This overarching principle of the right to
bodily autonomy does not limit itself to abortion specifically, but applies to
broader scenarios allowing pregnant women to make their own decisions.
Thus, Casey stands for the principle that a state cannot interfere with a
pregnant woman’s pregnancy-terminating health care decisions pre-viability
in the interest of protecting the fetus, and this rule applies to pregnancy
exclusion laws where the termination of pregnancy is a byproduct of the
health care decision to die a natural death. 105
Additionally, it is appropriate to analyze pregnancy exclusion statutes
as abortion restrictions because, like abortion restrictions, pregnancy
exclusion laws seek to ensure that as many fetuses as possible are brought to
term. 106 Pregnancy exclusion statutes place a higher value on the fetus
coming to term than the right of the pregnant woman to make autonomous
decisions, suggesting the laws are guided by the motivation to protect the
“potentiality of life.” 107 Because most pregnancy exclusion laws void the
advance directives of all pregnant women, even if they stated their wishes
would not change in the case of pregnancy, it is evident that “accurately
capturing a woman’s preferences cannot be legislators’ only concern.”108 In
this sense, pregnancy exclusion laws “represent an unprecedented and
extraordinary step beyond abortion restrictions” because unlike abortion
restrictions, which prohibit action a pregnant woman wants to take,
pregnancy exclusions “mandate action that a pregnant woman must take
despite her clearly indicated intentions.” 109
The right to an abortion is grounded in the U.S. Constitution’s Due
Process Clauses, in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which state
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–79 (1992).
Id. at 846. But see David McQuoid-Mason, Does Withdrawing Treatment from a Pregnant
Persistent Vegetative State Patient Resulting in Her Death Constitute a Termination of Pregnancy?, 8 S.
AFR. J. BIOETHICS & L. 8, 9 (2015) (explaining that withdrawing life support from a pregnant patient in
a persistent vegetative state is not classified as a termination of pregnancy because it is “merely the natural
consequence of a pregnant PVS mother dying”).
106
Schwager, supra note 30, at 614 (noting that opponents of pregnancy exclusion statutes argue that
they “violate the female patient’s right to abortion [before the fetus is viable], especially those statutes
which automatically invalidate a woman’s advance directive upon a pregnancy diagnosis”); Youngsmith,
supra note 60, at 419 (admitting that a “common thread . . . weaves through pregnancy exceptions and
state limits on abortion: both seek to inhibit the medical decisions of pregnant women in an effort to
protect fetal life”); Anna North & Catherine Kim, The “Heartbeat” Bills that Could Ban Almost All
Abortions, Explained, VOX (June 28, 2019, 9:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/4/19/18412384/abortion-heartbeat-bill-georgia-louisiana-ohio-2019
[https://perma.cc/AK32-4A7L] (explaining that the justification for state heartbeat bills, which ban
abortions as early as six weeks after conception, is to “‘save lives’”).
107
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
108
Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1054.
109
Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 433–34.
104
105
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that no person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” 110 Modern jurisprudence concludes that the concept of
liberty in the Due Process Clause guarantees protection of certain
fundamental rights. 111 The Supreme Court first held that a right to privacy in
reproductive decision-making is one such due process right fundamental to
one’s personal liberty when it decided Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965. 112
In 1973, the Supreme Court extended this right in Roe v. Wade when it held
that the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s decision to terminate a
pregnancy and determined that the state’s interest in preserving fetal life only
reaches its “compelling” point at fetal viability. 113 In reaching its decision,
the Supreme Court was guided by a set of concerns raised by situations in
which a woman did not have the choice to have an abortion, such as forcing
a woman to take care of an additional life and potential psychological
harm. 114 The Court in Roe v. Wade set up a trimester framework giving
women an absolute right to terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester,
with the option for states to impose more stringent restrictions in the last two
trimesters when their interests in maternal health and potential fetal life are
more compelling. 115

110

(1992).

U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,846–47

111
See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–49. The fundamental rights derived from the concept of liberty
in the Due Process Clause are considered “substantive due process” rights, and there exists controversy
around their legitimacy. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, Twelve Problems with Substantive Due Process,
16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397 (2018) (criticizing the substantive due process doctrine); Timothy
Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 283, 284 (2012) (“Perhaps no doctrine in constitutional law has produced so much calumny as the
theory commonly known as substantive due process.”).
112
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses the right
of married couples to use contraceptives).
113
410 U.S. 113, 153, 163 (1973).
114
Id. at 153 (“The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this
choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future. Psychological harm may be imminent.”).
115
Id. at 163–65. According to the trimester framework outlined in Roe, a woman’s right to terminate
a pregnancy is unregulated in the first trimester. Id. at 163. During the second trimester, “a State may
regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health.” Id. The Court provided certain examples of what would constitute
permissible state regulation in the second trimester, such as “the qualifications of the person who is to
perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be
performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-thanhospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.” Id. During the third trimester, a woman’s
right to terminate a pregnancy may be legally denied by a state because the state’s interest in protecting
fetal life becomes compelling after viability “except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of
the mother.” Id. at 163–64.
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In 1992, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the central holding of Roe v. Wade regarding the existence of a
fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy, but the plurality reframed that
right as the right to terminate a pregnancy without an “undue burden” from
the state. 116 Furthermore, the Court in Casey changed the trimester
framework to the current “fetal viability” framework in determining when
the state’s interest in the potential life of a fetus could become compelling
enough to justify restrictions that override a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy. 117 By enacting this change, the Court allowed states to impose
more restrictions on a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy before
viability than was previously permissible under the trimester framework, as
long as those restrictions did not operate as undue burdens. 118 The undue
burden test from Casey states that regulations that have the purpose or effect
of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman who seeks an abortion before
viability impose an undue burden on that right, and are therefore invalid. 119
Even though fetal viability serves as a crucial line in defining a woman’s
right to an abortion without an undue burden, it is also important to note that
the Supreme Court emphasized in Casey that a state’s compelling interest in
potential fetal life after viability can still be overcome if the mother’s life
would be threatened by continuing the pregnancy. 120
In 2016, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the Supreme Court
clarified how lower courts should apply the undue burden test by explaining
that the “rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those
laws confer.” 121 Following this decision, courts have applied the undue
116
505 U.S. at 879–901 (plurality opinion) (holding that Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act’s
provisions requiring informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period, and parental consent were not an undue
burden).
117
Id. at 860 (“[V]iability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.”). According to the
“fetal viability” framework, if a fetus is not yet viable (“the time at which there is a realistic possibility
of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb”), a woman has the right to terminate the pregnancy
without an undue burden by the state. Id. at 870. An undue burden exists “if its purpose or effect is to
place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”
Id. at 878. If a fetus is determined to be viable, a woman may be legally denied an abortion because the
state’s interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling enough to outweigh the woman’s right to
terminate the pregnancy, except when the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Id. at 860, 879.
118
Id. at 877.
119
Id. (“[A] statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state
interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”).
120
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
121
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
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burden test by weighing the benefits of restrictions against the burden on a
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy. 122 As a result, scholars have noted
that it has become easy for state abortion restrictions to survive the undue
burden test. 123 Although pregnancy exclusion laws are not about abortion
specifically, the principles of undue burdens and fetal viability are thus
applicable to evaluating pregnancy exclusion laws under Casey’s abortion
restriction framework, which is what this Section proceeds to do. 124
1. Category One: Void Per Se
Based on Casey’s framework, it follows that Category One state
pregnancy exclusion laws, which never honor a woman’s advance health
care directives, even when she clearly communicates her wishes to refuse
treatment in the case of pregnancy (and, by implication, end the pregnancy),
are unconstitutional in cases where the fetus is not viable. 125 Under the undue
burden test, Category One laws that automatically void the advance
directives of pregnant patients constitute undue burdens by restricting “a
woman from exercising her right to abortion whether the fetus is developed
See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938, 947–53 (W.D. Tex. 2017)
(analyzing the constitutionality of restrictions that imposed penalties on physicians who performed a
standard procedure for a second-trimester abortion, by weighing the benefits of the restrictions with the
burdens).
123
See, e.g., Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 385 (2006) (explaining multiple ways courts have manipulated
the undue burden standard to “substantially undermine Roe’s core protections”); see also Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs
Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1476, 1478 (2016) (explaining that “judgments about which burdens are
undue will vary across contexts” and can depend “on the manner in which the state is vindicating its
interest in regulating abortion”); Chelsea M. Donaldson, Note, Constitutional Law/Reproductive
Justice—Breaking the Trap: How Whole Woman’s Health Protects Abortion Access, and the Substantive
Due Process Clause’s Rebuke of Anti-Abortion Regulations, 40 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 282 (2018)
(arguing that the “cloudiness surrounding the ‘undue burden’ standard has led to many clashes of thought
within the court system, allowing for legislatures to make the argument that any state interest (ranging
from protecting women’s health to the potentiality of life) is justifiable against the undue burden it places
upon a woman’s right to seek and obtain an abortion”).
124
See supra Section II.A.
125
Category One states include Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, South
Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510
(2019); IND. CODE § 16-36-4-8(d) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103(a) (2016); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 700.5512(1) (2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-507 (2018);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-123 (2018); WIS.
STAT. § 154.03 (2018); see Schwager, supra note 30, at 615 (arguing that automatic statutes voiding the
advance directives of pregnant patients is inconsistent with Casey); Villarreal, supra note 23 (arguing that
the most restrictive state statutes appear to be unconstitutional because they represent an undue burden of
a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy); Humphrey, supra note 60, at 692 (arguing that “pregnancy
exclusions that automatically invalidate a woman’s advance directive impose a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy when the fetus is non-viable, and thus likely violate
the ‘undue burden’ test set forth in Casey”); see also Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 442 (arguing that
states with “the most severe pregnancy exceptions” conflict with the right to bodily autonomy).
122

992

114:969 (2020)

Decisions in the Dark

to 22 weeks or simply two days.” 126 Under the undue burden standard, if a
woman has advance health care directives clearly communicating that she
wants to be removed from life-sustaining treatment even if she is pregnant,
then in the event of incapacitation the woman’s physicians should honor her
request to suspend life support, provided the fetus is not yet viable. Because
the statutory language does not allow a physician to suspend life support for
a pregnant woman under any circumstances, this functionally prevents the
woman from terminating her pregnancy before fetal viability, despite a
manifestation of intent to do so. Thus, Category One laws present a
substantial obstacle to exercising the constitutional rights enshrined in Roe
and Casey.
Even where a woman’s advance directives instruct a physician to
remove life support but do not clarify whether she would want to remove life
support in the case of pregnancy, Category One laws are still unconstitutional
under Casey because these laws do not respect a woman’s competent
decision to terminate a pregnancy before viability, under the assumption that
every woman would change her mind despite what health care directives say.
These laws also unconstitutionally restrict the decisions of health care agents
acting on behalf of the incapacitated woman, as in the Marlise Muñoz case,
where the physicians refused the husband’s request to take his wife off life
support. 127 Health care agents have the power to engage in substitute
decision-making on behalf of an incapacitated person, meaning that when a
health care agent conveys that a pregnant patient would want to remove life
support to die a natural death, the agent operates as the patient legally
exercising her constitutional right. 128
Accordingly, restricting the right of health care agents to terminate the
principal’s pregnancy before viability operates as an undue burden on the
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy by placing the decision in the hands
of an attending physician instead—an actor who is notably prohibited by law
to act as a health care agent for their own patient.129 Thus, these laws not
only prevent competent pregnant women from exercising their right to previability abortion by voicing their decisions in advance, but also prevent
incompetent women from exercising their right by voicing their decisions
through health care agents. 130 These laws therefore operate as undue burdens
by providing no option at all to exercise the right to a pre-viability abortion,

126
127
128
129
130

GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 5.
See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
Jones, supra note 35, at § 34.
GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 5.
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though two alternative ways can certainly exist through the use of a living
will or a health care proxy. 131
2.

Category Two: Void if the Fetus Can Develop to Birth at Some
Level of Certainty
Category Two state pregnancy exclusion laws, which require
physicians to void a pregnant woman’s advance directives based on a
physician’s determination of whether it is “possible” or “probable” that the
fetus could be brought to live birth or viability, as well as Ohio’s law
requiring a “reasonable degree of medical certainty” that a fetus could not be
born alive, also constitute undue burdens on a woman’s right to terminate
her pregnancy. 132 All of these standards are difficult for physicians to apply
due to vagueness and because it is “difficult to determine if a pregnancy will
develop to a live birth since these cases are rare and the prognosis of many
of these fetuses is poor or unknown.” 133 Despite advances in medical
technology with the ability to sustain a fetus to term, 134 the treatment of
pregnant women in a persistent vegetative state for this particular purpose is
not standardized and there is no guidance as to how a physician would
interpret these terms. 135
The language of whether it is “possible” that the fetus could be brought
to live birth is similarly broad enough to be met in all cases of pregnancy

131

See id.
Category Two states include Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Rhode Island. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055(b) (2018); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (2018); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 35/3(c) (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.13(3) (2019);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-202(3) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-408 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 449A.451 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (2018); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6(c)
(2018); see Schwager, supra note 30, at 616 (arguing that terms like “probable” are too vague and
subjective, and thus likely present an undue burden to the right to terminate a pregnancy); Villarreal,
supra note 23, at 1067 (arguing that states who “force women to accept unwanted medical care if it is
‘possible’ or ‘probable’ the fetus will develop to have a ‘live birth’ may also be violating the Constitution”
because the standards are too all-encompassing); Humphrey, supra note 60, at 692 (arguing that
pregnancy exclusion statutes with the terms “probable” and “live birth” are phrased too broadly and
constitute an undue burden on the right to terminate a pregnancy); GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at
6 (arguing the term “probable live birth” is too vague and all-encompassing that it “creates the same
problem that arises with statutes that invalidate advance directives for pregnant patients altogether”).
133
Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1060.
134
Esmaeilzadeh et al., supra note 16, at 79–80.
135
Romagano et al., supra note 24, at 107; cf. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (defining
medical judgment broadly by stating it “may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors
may relate to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical
judgment.”).
132
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with today’s advanced medical technology. 136 “Possible” is defined by
Merriam-Webster as “being within the limits of ability, capacity, or
realization,” “being something that may or may not occur,” or “being
something that may or may not be true or actual.” 137 Under this broad
definition of “possible,” considering the advanced medical technology that
can sustain a fetus in an incapacitated body for the entire term of
pregnancy, 138 it will almost always be “possible” with today’s technology
that a fetus could be brought to term. 139 Thus, the four state statutes 140 that
void a woman’s advance directives if it is “possible” that the fetus could be
born alive pose undue burdens under Casey by presenting a substantial
obstacle to exercising the right to terminate a pregnancy before viability.
Similarly, the statutes that require a physician to void a pregnant
woman’s advance health directives if it is “probable” that a fetus could be
brought to live birth are also so all-encompassing that they would require
voiding a pregnant woman’s advance directives in most pregnancy
circumstances. 141 “Probable” implies a greater than fifty-percent chance, and
is defined by Merriam-Webster as “supported by evidence strong enough to
establish presumption but not proof,” “establishing a probability,” or “likely
to be or become true or real.” 142 These broad and obscure definitions of
“probable” do not give meaningful guidance to physicians on how to make
a determination of whether it is probable a fetus could develop to term.
Further, while “probable” is a more demanding standard in this context than
“possible,” the existence of modern prenatal technology that can sustain a
fetus in an incapacitated body seem to make it “probable” the fetus could

136
The term “possible” is even less restrictive than the term “probable,” so it creates the same
problem of vagueness and overly broad application.
137
Possible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
possible [https://perma.cc/W88L-TZRH].
138
Romagano et al., supra note 24, at 107–08.
139
Cf. GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 6.
140
These states include Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c)
(2018); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.6 (2018); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145B.13(3) (2019).
141
These states include Alaska, Delaware, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, and Rhode Island. ALASKA
STAT. ANN. § 13.52.055(b) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 509-202(3) (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-408(3) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449A.451 (2018);
23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-4.11-6(c) (2018). For discussion regarding these statutes’ breadth, see
GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 6 (“The term[] ‘probable live birth’ is extremely vague and can be
easily be stretched to encompass any stage of pregnancy. A fetus will ‘probably’ develop to live birth
from any point in development as long as the woman carrying it continues to receive life-prolonging
treatment, barring severe complications.”).
142
Probable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
probable [https://perma.cc/XN8M-RGLY].
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develop to live birth in nearly all cases 143—even if that results in harm to the
woman or deformities to the fetus, because these statutes do not appear to
consider what condition the fetus is born in, as long as it is technically alive.
Thus, statutes that void a woman’s advance directives if it is “probable” that
the fetus could be born alive also operate as undue burdens under Casey by
presenting a substantial obstacle to exercising the right to terminate a
pregnancy before viability.
Finally, Ohio’s pregnancy exclusion law, which voids a pregnant
woman’s advance directives unless there is a “reasonable degree of medical
certainty” 144 that the fetus would not be born alive, is even more restrictive
than the previous two levels of certainty, given advances in prenatal care. 145
Only in exceptional cases would a physician be able to determine it is
“reasonably certain” that the fetus would not develop to live birth with the
assistance of today’s advanced medical technology, given that the statute
does not consider whether the fetus is born with deformities or
complications. 146 Ohio’s law thus seems to function in practice as a Category
One law, rendering advance directives void per se. Overall, these broad
statutes impose significant restrictions that qualify as undue burdens on a
woman’s ability to terminate her pregnancy before viability, and they should
be considered unconstitutional under Casey. Thus, Category Two state
pregnancy exclusion laws are also unconstitutional.
3. Category Three: Void Unless an Ethical Condition Is Met
Category Three state pregnancy exclusion laws attempt to balance the
rights of the woman and fetus in a way that is nonetheless still
constitutionally problematic under Casey. 147 Generally, these laws provide
that physicians must void the advance directives of pregnant women unless
sustaining treatment “will not maintain the woman in a way to permit the
continuing development and live birth” of the fetus, will be “physically
harmful to the woman,” or will “prolong severe pain which cannot be
143
Esmaeilzadeh et al., supra note 16, at 75, 80 (explaining potential technological needs to sustain
fetal life in women who are brain-dead or in a persistent vegetative state, including mechanical respiratory
ventilation, cardiovascular support and monitoring, endocrine support, thermoregulation, warming
blankets, and nutritional support).
144
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.06 (2018).
145
See, e.g., Romagano et al., supra note 24 (describing extensive medical interventions to protect a
fetus developing in its brain-dead mother). It is important to note that advanced technologies are not yet
at the point of erasing the concept of “viability.” See id.
146
Id. (explaining the ventilator and nutritional technological support that can sustain a fetus to live
birth after the mother experiences clinical brain-death).
147
These states include Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5429(a) (2018); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-12D-10 (2018).
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alleviated by medication.” 148 These types of laws appear to provide
physicians with more flexibility to take into account the dignitary rights of
an incapacitated pregnant woman by considering physical harm and severe
pain, 149 though “if a pregnant woman is ‘unable to communicate verbally or
nonverbally,’ whether or not severe pain has been ‘alleviated by medication’
is a matter of sheer speculation by the physician.” 150 However, these laws
operate as undue burdens because they completely ignore the concept of
present fetal viability, as Casey demands. 151 Instead, these laws focus on
future fetal viability by voiding advance directives even if the fetus is not
viable at that moment, unless the fetus is likely not to survive. Thus, based
on the face of the statutory language, even if such laws appear to balance the
dignitary interests of the pregnant woman with the interests of the state, they
148
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (2018) (“Notwithstanding the execution of an advance
directive, life sustaining treatment and artificially-provided nutrition and hydration shall be provided to
a pregnant woman unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . the procedures will not maintain
the woman in a way to permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child, will be
physically harmful to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by medication.”);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone,
authorize, or approve: (a) The consent to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant
principal, unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . such treatment or procedures will not
maintain the principal in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the fetus
or will be physically harmful to the principal or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by
medication.”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017) (“Notwithstanding a contrary direction
contained in a health care directive executed under this chapter, health care must be provided to a pregnant
principal unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . such health care will not maintain the
principal in such a way as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will
be physically harmful or unreasonably painful to the principal or will prolong severe pain that cannot be
alleviated by medication.”); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 5429 (2018) (“Notwithstanding the
existence of a living will, a health care decision by a health care representative or health care agent or any
other direction to the contrary, life-sustaining treatment, nutrition and hydration shall be provided to a
pregnant woman who is incompetent and has an end-stage medical condition or who is permanently
unconscious unless, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . life-sustaining treatment, nutrition
and hydration: (1) will not maintain the pregnant woman in such a way as to permit the continuing
development and live birth of the unborn child; (2) will be physically harmful to the pregnant woman; or
(3) will cause pain to the pregnant woman that cannot be alleviated by medication.”); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-12D-10 (2018) (“Notwithstanding a declaration made pursuant to this chapter, life-sustaining
treatment and artificial nutrition and hydration shall be provided to a pregnant woman unless, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . such procedures will not maintain the woman in such a way
as to permit the continuing development and live birth of the unborn child or will be physically harmful
to the woman or prolong severe pain which cannot be alleviated by medication.”).
149
See Schwager, supra note 30, at 603 (noting these types of laws “provide for more leeway” for
physicians). Note that Schwager’s framework categorizes pregnancy exclusion laws differently and calls
these laws “Category Two,” while the framework in this Note puts them in Category Three. Id.
150
Hope E. Matchan & Kathryn E. Sheffield, Adding Constitutional Depravation to Untimely Death:
South Dakota’s Living Will Pregnancy Provision, 37 S.D. L. REV. 388, 389 (1992) (citation omitted).
151
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (“[V]iability marks the earliest
point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on
nontherapeutic abortions.”).
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could also justify voiding the advance directives of an incapacitated woman
who is only one week pregnant and therefore fail under Casey.
4.

Category Four: Void Unless the Woman Specifically States “In
the Case of Pregnancy”
Category Four state pregnancy exclusion laws—which void a woman’s
advance directives if she does not specifically state her wishes “in the case
of pregnancy”—allow physicians to honor a pregnant woman’s advance
directives to remove life support if these specify that her wishes would be
the same in the case of pregnancy. 152 However, these laws are still
unconstitutional because they prohibit physicians from honoring the decision
of health care agents to terminate a woman’s pregnancy before fetal viability
in cases where a woman did not clearly communicate what her decision
would be in the case of pregnancy. As mentioned above, 153 health care agents
have the power to exercise substituted decision-making on behalf of an
incapacitated person, meaning that a proxy’s decision to remove life support
for a pregnant patient operates as the patient legally exercising her
constitutional right. 154 This right is respected in the abortion context when a
health care proxy communicates that an incompetent person would have
wanted to terminate a pregnancy legally, 155 and accordingly should be
respected in this context where a health care agent instructs a physician to
remove life support, where ending a pregnancy is merely the byproduct of a
medical decision. Restricting the right of health care agents to suspend life
support of a pregnant person before fetal viability, functionally terminating
the pregnancy, is an undue burden on the woman’s right to terminate a
pregnancy.
5. Category Five: Honor if Pregnant, Unless the Fetus Is Viable
Finally, Colorado’s Category Five pregnancy exclusion law, which
honors a woman’s advance directives before viability even if she does not
specify her preferences in the case of pregnancy, is unconstitutional because
it fails to include an exception after viability to save the life or health of the
152
These states include Florida, Arizona, Oklahoma, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey,
Vermont, and Washington. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.113 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3262 (2018);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 3101.8(c) (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-575a (2018); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 31-32-9 (2018); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH–GEN. § 5-603 (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-56 (2018);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9702 (2018); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030 (2019).
153
See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
154
See Necheles, supra note 34, § 9.
155
See Hilary Mabel et al., Decision-Making for an Incapacitated Pregnant Patient, 47 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 12, 12–15 (2017) (describing a case that came before a clinical ethics team where an
incompetent pregnant patient’s mother was deemed her health care surrogate, and instructed physicians
to terminate her daughter’s eighteen-week pregnancy based on her daughter’s previous abortions and the
health risks of the pregnancy).
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mother. At first glance, Colorado’s Category Five law may appear to pass
constitutional muster under Casey because it requires physicians to honor a
pregnant woman’s advance directives to remove life support so long as the
fetus is not viable, and thus arguably respects the right to terminate a
pregnancy before fetal viability without undue burden from the state. 156 This
law also allows physicians to honor the decisions of a health care agent to
suspend life support in the absence of advance directives so long as this
decision is made prior to viability. 157
However, Colorado’s Category Five pregnancy exclusion law is still
unconstitutional because the law directs physicians to void the advance
directives of pregnant patients after viability, and yet fails to include an
exception after viability to save the life or health of the mother, which Casey
demands. 158 It is unclear whether a “life or health” exception post-viability
would apply in this context, given that an incapacitated pregnant patient
would be kept alive to sustain a fetus; thus, this theory hinges on whether a
woman’s health would suffer severe harm if the pregnancy were sustained.
Furthermore, as described in Part III, this law is ethically problematic
because it risks restricting the autonomy of individuals to make informed
decisions about their end-of-life care through a health care agent when there
is overwhelming evidence that a woman would not have intended to suspend
life support in the event of a nonviable pregnancy. 159 That is, from the face
of the law’s language, it appears a doctor could not honor a health care
agent’s request to maintain life support of a pregnant woman if the advance
directive ordered removal but did not address the issue of pregnancy, which
could potentially place physicians in an uncomfortable position when there
is compelling evidence that the woman would have changed her mind. 160

156
COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (2018) (“In the case of a declaration of a qualified patient
known to the attending physician to be pregnant, a medical evaluation shall be made as to whether the
fetus is viable. If the fetus is viable, the declaration shall be given no force or effect until the patient is no
longer pregnant.”).
157
See id. §§ 15-18-104(1)–(2), (7)–(8).
158
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (explaining that a woman may
be legally denied an abortion after viability because the state’s interest in protecting fetal life becomes
compelling enough to outweigh the woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy, except when the abortion
is necessary to preserve “the life or health of the mother”).
159
See infra Part III.
160
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104(2) (2018) (“In the case of a declaration of a qualified patient
known to the attending physician to be pregnant, a medical evaluation shall be made as to whether the
fetus is viable. If the fetus is viable, the declaration shall be given no force or effect until the patient is no
longer pregnant.”).
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B. Right to Refuse Lifesaving Medical Treatment
In addition to violating a woman’s constitutional right to terminate her
pregnancy, all state pregnancy exclusion laws violate the constitutional right
of a competent person to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.161 In
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court
decided that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in making their own health care decisions, including refusing
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.162 The Court acknowledged that an
incompetent patient’s health care surrogates may be required by the state to
demonstrate clear and convincing evidence that the patient would have
wanted to refuse lifesaving treatment; 163 however, advance directives
expressly stating a patient would want to remove lifesaving treatment meet
this burden of proof. 164 As a result of the Cruzan decision, advance directives
became common tools to exercise the constitutional right to refuse lifesaving
medical treatment. 165
Courts have further held that the right to refuse lifesaving medical
treatment extends to family members and health care agents. In an influential
case, In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a person’s right
to privacy under the U.S. Constitution can be asserted on their behalf by their
guardian or family members, who may decide whether to remove lifesustaining treatment for that person in the absence of advance directives or a
living will. 166 While the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a person does not
have a “right to die” with active aid by physicians, 167 the right to refuse
161
Competence to sign legal testamentary documents is generally referred to as “mental capacity,”
which means one must have a sound mind to execute certain legal documents. See generally Robert
Whitman, Capacity for Lifetime and Estate Planning, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 1061 (2013) (discussing
various capacity standards in legal transactions). The definitions of legal competence vary by jurisdiction,
but generally focus on “cognitive aspects of decisions, especially the patient’s abilities to comprehend
information, to communicate choices, or to communicate rational choices.” Allen C. Snyder, Competency
to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment: Valuing the Nonlogical Aspects of a Person’s Decisions, 10 ISSUES IN L.
& MED. 299, 307 (1994).
162
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (“[F]or the purposes of this case, we assume that the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition.”).
163
Id. at 280.
164
Schwager, supra note 30, at 600.
165
See id. at 600–01.
166
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 661 (N.J. 1976) (holding a person’s right to privacy could be asserted
on her behalf by her guardian); Michele Yuen, Comment, Letting Daddy Die: Adopting New Standards
for Surrogate Decisionmaking, 39 UCLA L. REV. 581, 597–98 (1992) (explaining the importance of In
re Quinlan in allowing a guardian to exercise substituted judgment in making a decision to remove life
support of a patient).
167
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06, 709–10 (1997) (reasoning that history,
traditions, and practice support the constitutionality of criminalizing physician-assisted suicide).
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medical treatment outlined in Cruzan and Quinlan illustrates a constitutional
right to die if the means are passive. 168
Similarly, the state’s interest in preserving potential human life should
never overcome a person’s constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving
medical treatment. 169 At least one state has acknowledged that parents have
the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment for infants born extremely
prematurely who have terminal complications or diseases. 170 There are also
numerous cases of courts holding that a pregnant woman has the right to
refuse a cesarean section procedure needed to save the life of her viable fetus
because forced medical treatment would unconstitutionally infringe on that
woman’s personal liberty. 171 While there have been some cases where courts
have ignored a pregnant woman’s objections and subsequently forced her to
submit to a cesarean section procedure, these cases based their analysis on
weighing the state’s interest in the potential life of a fetus against the right to
an abortion. 172 However, courts should be weighing the state’s interest in the
potential life of a fetus with the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment—
where no state interest in potential life should overcome this right—rather
168

(1976).

Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S 261, 284 (1990); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 672

169
Several courts have held that this right to remove life-sustaining medical treatment, and
subsequently die a natural death, cannot be overcome by the state’s interests in preserving human life
because forcing medical treatment infringes on personal liberty. See, e.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army
Med. Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding a competent, terminally ill patient has the
right to refuse life support); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4, 14–15, 17 (Fla. 1990)
(rejecting a judicial procedure requiring a surrogate to get court approval for health care decisions because
the state’s interests were not substantial enough to outweigh the constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment through a surrogate); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (N.J. 1985) (stating the state’s interest
in preserving human life is typically outweighed by a person’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewic, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425–26 (Mass. 1977)
(contending the state has a significant interest in preserving human life, which is outweighed when the
illness is incurable).
170
See HCA, Inc. v. Miller ex rel. Miller, 36 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Tex. Comm’n App. 2000) (“[U]nless
a child’s need for life-sustaining medical is too urgent for consent to be obtained from a parent . . . a
doctor’s treatment of the child without such consent is actionable even if the condition requiring treatment
would eventually be life-threatening . . . .”).
171
See e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1240, 1252 (D.C. App. 1990) (acknowledging the right of a
pregnant woman to refuse a cesarean section needed to save the potential life of her twenty-six-week-old
fetus); see also In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 333–34 (Ill. App. 1994) (recognizing the right of a
pregnant woman to refuse a cesarean section needed to save the life of her fetus, and finding the state’s
interest in potential life not compelling enough to override this right).
172
See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964)
(directing trial court to issue order requiring blood transfusions to be performed on a pregnant mother in
her thirty-second week of pregnancy if necessary to save the woman and the fetus); see also Lynn M.
Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States,
1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. H. POL. POL’Y & L. 299,
317 (2013) (describing additional cases where pregnant women have been forced to submit to medical
interventions).
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than analyzing these types of cases under the abortion restriction framework
that seemingly allows for more permissive restrictions after viability. 173
To illustrate the critical difference between weighing state interests
under the abortion restriction framework and the right-to-refuse-medicaltreatment framework, In re A.C. is instructive. 174 There, a patient with cancer
was pregnant with a viable fetus and was very close to death. 175 The patient
was forced to submit to a cesarean section procedure, and tragically the baby
and mother died shortly after. 176 The D.C. Court of Appeals held that a neardeath pregnant patient with a viable fetus has the right to decide whether to
submit to a medical procedure under the principle that “courts do not compel
one person to permit a significant intrusion upon his or her bodily integrity
for the benefit of another person’s health.” 177 The court distinguished from
other cases where courts have forced pregnant women with viable fetuses to
submit to cesarean section procedures by explaining that these courts “have
usually acted to vindicate the state’s interest in protecting third parties, even
if in fetal state.” 178 The court instead held that the interest in protecting fetal
life was not compelling enough to override the right to refuse medical
treatment, explaining:
This right of bodily integrity belongs equally to persons who are
competent and persons who are not. Further, it matters not what the
quality of a patient’s life may be; the right of bodily integrity is not
extinguished simply because someone is ill, or even at death’s door. To
protect that right against intrusion by others—family members, doctors,
hospitals, or anyone else, however well-intentioned—we hold that a
court must determine the patient’s wishes by any means available, and
must abide by those wishes unless there are truly extraordinary or
compelling reasons to override them. When the patient is incompetent,
or when the court is unable to determine competency, the substituted
judgment procedure must be followed. 179
Thus, the requirement of competence does not create an opening for
state lawmakers and physicians to void advance health care directives when
a pregnant woman is in a persistent vegetative state. The court clarified that
173
See supra note 169 and accompanying text; see also Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1067 (arguing
that “the state’s interest may never be strong enough to justify violating a woman’s bodily autonomy,
regardless of how far along she is in a pregnancy”).
174
In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1238, 1252 (acknowledging the right of a pregnant woman to refuse a
cesarean section needed to save the potential life of her twenty-six-week-old fetus).
175
Id. at 1238.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 1243–44.
178
Id. at 1246.
179
Id. at 1247 (citation omitted).
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even if a pregnant woman is declared incompetent and is unable to make an
informed decision, the court must execute substituted judgment in making
the decision. 180
While some scholars have argued that a pregnant woman in a persistent
vegetative state who has advance directives to remove life-sustaining
treatment has no current liberty interests at stake in that scenario, 181 this
position fundamentally ignores other legal schemes designed to allow
individuals to exercise their liberty interest preemptively. For example,
organ donation also involves a strong interest in keeping other people alive,
yet the law in that arena demands that physicians only sustain people to
prepare for organ donation with their previous consent. 182 Furthermore,
individuals are free to communicate their desires in advance about how their
bodily remains should be handled and cared for, and these autonomous
decisions are respected under the law even after an individual dies. 183 These
legal schemes demonstrate that the principle of respecting a person’s bodily
autonomy and wishes, even after death, should prevent physicians from
overriding a woman’s clearly communicated treatment preferences to
prioritize the potential life of a fetus.
Id. at 1248–49.
See Bertha A. Manninen, Sustaining a Pregnant Cadaver for the Purpose of Gestating a Fetus: A
Limited Defense, 26 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 399, 404 (2016) (“An insentient pregnant woman
cannot suffer the physical or emotional burdens of continued medical treatment or pregnancy, and thus
arguably does not possess current interests in bodily integrity or procreative liberty.” (quoting Katherine
A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death’s Door, 7 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 85, 116 (1997)).
182
David Orentlicher et al., Organ Transplantation: The Control, Use, and Allocation of Body Parts,
in BIOETHICS & PUB. HEALTH L. 305 (3d ed., 2013). Some scholars who favor extinguishing rights at
death, and thus support voiding the advance directives of pregnant women receiving life-sustaining
treatment, also support organ donation for all patients who pass even if they do not consent because “[n]o
one has the right to say what should be done to their body after death.” See H. E. Emson, It Is Immoral to
Require Consent for Cadaver Organ Donation, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 125 (2003). An argument was made
in Portugal that if a pregnant woman is designated as an organ donor, then that woman provides consent
to sustain her fetus to term. See Portugal Baby Born to Woman Brain Dead for Three Months, supra note
19 (explaining that the decision to keep a fetus sustained in a brain-dead Portuguese woman was based
on the fact that “she had never opted out of Portugal’s presumed-consent organ donation law,” and that
“[b]eing a donor is not just about being in a position to donate a liver or heart or lung, but also being in a
position to give yourself so a child can live”). This argument is flawed with respect to the U.S., given that
sustaining a pregnant woman to develop a fetus, a genetically distinct life form that serves no specific
function beyond its own individual development, is categorically different from sustaining a pregnant
woman to preserve her organs, which are groups of cells and tissues that perform specific functions in a
human body. Compare Fetus (Medical Definition), MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fetus [https://perma.cc/3PK5-NVXW], with Organ
(Medical Definition), MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
organ [https://perma.cc/G9WE-JXDT].
183
See NORMAN L. CANTOR, AFTER WE DIE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE HUMAN CADAVER 29
(2010) (explaining that human remains “receive[] a variety of entitlements and protections . . . such as
decent disposal of a cadaver, quiet repose, and postmortem human dignity”).
180
181
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Given that courts have recognized the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment as a fundamental right, it is never appropriate to void a pregnant
woman’s clearly communicated wishes to suspend life support, even after
viability. 184 Therefore, in cases where a statute orders a physician to override
a woman’s clearly communicated advance directives to remove lifesustaining treatment in the case of pregnancy, all categories of state
pregnancy exclusion laws violate the woman’s right to refuse unwanted
lifesaving medical treatment. Even in cases where the fetus is viable, placing
the state’s interest (under Casey) in protecting the fetus against the patient’s
right to die with dignity, the state must lose. First, there is no constitutional
right to be born, 185 so the state’s assertion of such a right must yield to the
patient’s recognized constitutional right to refuse treatment. 186 Second, to
refuse to honor the patient’s right is to turn her into an artificial womb for an
unwanted fetus, reducing her to no more than an apparatus. 187 Such an
affront to human dignity could not be consistent with a constitutional right
to elect to die with dignity. 188
Furthermore, even if the woman’s advance directives do not clearly
state whether her end-of-life decisions would change in the case of
pregnancy, that lack of clarification only means that the decision should be
shifted to her health care agent or family members, who would then exercise
“substituted judgment” in making a decision that the woman would have
wanted given the circumstances. 189 Under no circumstances should the
legislature’s or physician’s judgment override that of either the patient or her
health care agent. Therefore, all pregnancy exclusion statutes violate the
patient’s constitutional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment
as recognized in Cruzan.

Others may reasonably disagree that the state should never void a pregnant woman’s express
advance directives to remove life support after viability, and there may be some point where a state’s
interest in potential human life overrides a woman’s right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. See
Elizabeth A. Marcuccio & Joseph P. McCollum, Advance Directives Containing Pregnancy Exclusions:
Are They Constitutional?, 34 N.E. J. L. STUD. 22, 34–35 (2015) (noting that the fundamental right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment is not absolute and can potentially be less compelling than the state’s
interest in potential human life). Consider, for example, a pregnant woman past her due date falling into
a persistent vegetative state after an accident. In this exceptional circumstance, perhaps a state may be
justified in removing a full-term fetus through a cesarean section procedure before the mother’s lifesupport is removed, but not in maintaining the patient on life support to further develop the fetus.
185
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (“[T]he unborn have never been recognized in the
law as persons in the whole sense.”).
186
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (establishing the supremacy of constitutional rights).
187
Youngsmith, supra note 60, at 442.
188
See id.
189
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
184
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III. BIOETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF STATE PREGNANCY
EXCLUSION STATUTES
Even if pregnancy exclusion laws are found to be constitutional or are
upheld in a narrow fashion, these laws raise serious ethical concerns about
whether physicians should be required to void a woman’s autonomous
decision. These concerns are heightened when physicians are forced to
maintain life support under state law even when the patient has clear
directives expressing that she would not want continued treatment. In the
absence of clear directives from the patient or her proxy, these laws still raise
ethical concerns because physicians are required to maintain life-sustaining
treatment, even if continued treatment would cause serious pain or physical
harm to the woman, and even if the fetus would likely face deformities or
complications if brought to term. 190 This Part explains general bioethical
principles for resolving ethical issues, explains the current bioethics issues
with pregnancy exclusion laws, and addresses how health care proxies can
ease lawmaker concerns that a woman would have changed her mind if she
knew she was pregnant.
The standard biomedical ethics approach to resolving ethical issues and
determining the appropriate course of action is to balance four principles: (1)
autonomy, (2) beneficence, (3) non-maleficence, and (4) justice.191 First, to
balance autonomy, physicians should best determine what the wishes of the
patient are in order to respect his or her autonomy. 192 This principle reflects
the “long tradition in medical care that the determination of the inefficacy of
treatment lies in the hands of the physician [but] the determination of the
undesirability of treatment lies with the patient,” 193 and also guides the
concept of informed consent, where a physician may not treat a patient
without the informed consent of the patient or her health care proxy, except

190
See Taylor, supra note 181, at 87 (“Also deeply troubling is that the large majority of [pregnancy]
restrictions legally compel the woman’s continued medical treatment regardless of such critical factors
as her own pain and suffering, the fetus’s age, or its prognosis for either a live birth or a healthy life after
birth.”).
191
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 1–12 (5th ed.
2001); Theresa L. Chin et al., Exploring Ethical Conflicts in Emergency Trauma Research: The COMBAT
(Control of Major Bleeding After Trauma) Study Experience, 157 SURGERY 10, 11 (2015); Nora Jacobson
& Diego S. Silva, Dignity Promotion and Beneficence, 7 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 365, 366 (2010);
Christopher T Le M Rustom et al., Ethical Issues in Resuscitation and Intensive Care Medicine,
11 ANAESTHESIA & INTENSIVE CARE MED. 1, 1–2 (2010).
192
Le M Rustom et al., supra note 191, at 1–2 (arguing the focus should be on maximal autonomy in
resuscitation ethical dilemmas because full autonomy is an idealistic notion).
193
California’s Natural Death Act—Medical Staff Conference, supra note 47, at 323 (emphasis
added).
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in very limited situations.194 To balance beneficence and non-maleficence,
physicians should best determine the patient’s interests, further the patient’s
interests, and avoid harm to the patient. 195 Both beneficence and nonmaleficence focus on what is in the patient’s best interests. 196 Beneficence
considers what courses of action would further the patient’s interests, while
non-maleficence considers what courses of action should not be taken
because they are in conflict with the patient’s interests—typically
embodying the general medical principles of “do not kill” and “do not cause
needless pain.” 197 Last, to balance justice, physicians are required to refrain
from making “clinical decisions based on arbitrary social value judgments
(age, race, sex, social status) as this would be unfair.” 198
Based on these basic bioethical principles, when a pregnant patient is
incompetent, a physician should honor the prior expressed preferences of the
patient in order to respect the patient’s autonomy, by first consulting her
living will. Physicians should do so not only because respecting a pregnant
patient’s directives best respects her autonomy, but also because physicians
are ethically obligated to take actions that further the patient’s interests, do
no harm, and do not reflect an arbitrary social value judgment based on the
fact that the patient is a pregnant woman. In the absence of a living will, a
physician should consult the patient’s health care proxy, who knows the
patient’s preferences and values and can exercise substitute decision-making
on behalf of the patient. In the absence of clear directives from the patient or
her proxy, physicians and health care proxies must make a judgment together
based on the patient’s past feelings, beliefs, and values. 199
In these scenarios, physicians and proxies should not be prohibited from
considering all potential ethical issues and medical risks in making a decision
about whether to void a pregnant woman’s advance health care directives.
Currently, physicians cannot consider any ethical factors under the
pregnancy exclusion statutes of most states, 200 or are limited in which ethical
factors may be considered in states that do allow physicians to weigh some
ethical considerations. 201 For example, many states have laws that only allow
See generally STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., The Doctrine of Informed Consent, 4A AM. L. TORTS
§ 15:71, Westlaw (database updated March 2019).
195
See Le M Rustom et al., supra note 191, at 2.
196
See id.
197
Id. (noting that “[b]eneficence is a positive requirement of action,” “relevant when the patient is
unable to act autonomously and when considering the potential futility of treatment”; whereas “[n]onmaleficence . . . requires refraining from actions that may cause harm”).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
See supra Sections I.A–I.B.
201
See supra Section I.C.
194
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consideration of the likelihood the fetus will develop to live birth, or
consideration of whether continued treatment would cause pain or physical
harm to the patient. 202 Instead, physicians and health care agents should be
empowered to weigh any relevant ethical considerations and medical risks
that could impact the woman or the fetus if the pregnant woman’s life is
prolonged on life support.
At least one scholar has argued that pregnancy exclusion laws can be
ethically permissible when the woman is brain-dead because the
psychological harms of compelling a woman to carry a fetus to term are
absent when a woman is in that state—claiming that the lack of intimacy that
can make forced pregnancy traumatic is absent in these rare scenarios.203
This argument rests on the premise that there is a unique relationship
between a mother and her fetus, but once the mother is incapacitated, she
will “never sense the burdens of gestation and will never have to rear the
child in progress.” 204 However, there are numerous reasons why a pregnant
patient in a persistent vegetative state may not want to continue lifesustaining treatment for the purposes of gestating a fetus, such as “cultural
or religious reasons,” “the pain and psychological stress of intrusive and
long-lasting medical treatment,” or even “the financial burden that excess
health care will put on their families after they die.” 205 The bioethical
principles described above suggest that the incapacity of a patient does not
render the decision to continue life-sustaining treatment to the physician—
the decision rests with the patient through her expressed advance directives,
or with the patient’s proxy in the absence of advance directives, based on the
patient’s wishes and values.
Furthermore, a concern that appears to underlie many existing state
pregnancy exclusion laws is the idea that a pregnant woman who had
previously drafted a living will or advance health care directives before she
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.629 (2018); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:10 (2018); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 23-06.5-09(5) (2017); 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5429 (2018); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-12D-10 (2018).
203
See, e.g., Manninen, supra note 181, at 403 (arguing that pregnancy is a unique experience
between a woman and fetus that can render forced pregnancy traumatic for someone who wants an
abortion; yet, brain-dead women receiving life-sustaining treatment are removed from these
psychological harms).
204
CANTOR, supra note 183, at 225. Cantor also contends that a “pregnant woman’s postmortem
interests in parenthood (or its avoidance) are not the same as her premortem interests.” Id.
205
Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1057–58. “[J]ust the act of keeping a woman on life support can be
dangerous for the fetus” because “ventilators and catheters are ‘major sources of infection’ that can harm
a fetus’s development.” Id. at 1060 (quoting Abuhasna Said et al., A Brain-Dead Pregnant Woman with
Prolonged Somatic Support and Successful Neonatal Outcome: A Grand Rounds Case with a Detailed
Review of Literature and Ethical Considerations, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL ILLNESS & INJ. SCI. 220, 223
(2013)).
202
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was pregnant would change her mind if she knew she were pregnant now. 206
But the law cannot and should not account for every contingency or fear that
women would amend their advance health care directives if they knew they
were pregnant. Although it is reasonable to assume in some circumstances
that a pregnant woman would make a different decision, having a law that
outright voids a woman’s previously expressed end-of-life instructions as a
hard-and-fast rule, without any other considerations, is not a viable
solution. 207 Lawmakers have no knowledge of these patients’ hearts and
minds, and physicians’ best resource to know the patients’ wishes comes
from the health care proxy. Therefore, the decision should ultimately remain
with the proxy, and it is inappropriate to require physicians to void a pregnant
woman’s advance directives under the misguided assumption that the
woman would necessarily change her mind.
IV. REFORMING STATE PREGNANCY EXCLUSION STATUTES
TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL
Because all state pregnancy exclusion statutes are both unconstitutional
and unethical, 208 this Note concludes that state legislatures must reform their
laws to create a pregnancy exclusion statute that both is constitutional and
conforms to today’s bioethical principles. Of course, one can question the
value of pregnancy exclusions at all. One scholar has argued that the best
option for states is to eliminate pregnancy exclusion laws and instead require
physicians to have conversations with their pregnant patients about what
their end-of-life wishes would be if they were to become incompetent during
the pregnancy. 209 The glaring lack of notice to both physicians and women
of the existence and effect of pregnancy exclusion laws is certainly a problem
that should be addressed by legislatures. 210 For example, on the federal level,
Congress should implement the CWPS study recommendation to amend the
Patient Self-Determination Act to require physicians to inform all women

206
See Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1053 (“One possible justification for excluding pregnant women
from using living wills . . . may be that the state believes women are unlikely to think about how their
preferences might change during pregnancy.”).
207
See id. at 1059 (“The fact that they are pregnant, however, would not necessarily convince women
who would be inclined to reject aggressive end-of-life medical care to accept it, and a pregnancy may
make some women less likely to accept such care.”).
208
Though Colorado’s Category Five pregnancy exclusion law may appear at first glance to pass
constitutional muster, this Note concludes it is likely unconstitutional. See supra Section II.A.5.
209
Villareal, supra note 23, at 1075 (arguing that this option preserves patient autonomy by providing
choices and allowing women to contemplate their end-of-life wishes should they become incompetent).
210
See id. at 1053, 1076.
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about the effect of state pregnancy laws on their advance directives; 211
however, physicians themselves may not even be aware of their existence. 212
Nonetheless, there is value in having pregnancy exclusion laws that are
both constitutional and ethical to provide physicians, patients, and courts
with a clear procedure that respects patient autonomy and dignity within our
constitutional frameworks. Some states that currently do not have pregnancy
exclusion laws have “conscience clauses” in their advance directives
legislation, which allow physicians to legally decline to follow a patient’s
advance directives based on “reasons of conscience.” 213 Thus, in these rare
and ethically complicated situations, the law must provide protections for
patient autonomy with a clear procedure physicians must follow to decide
the best course of action for a pregnant patient. 214 This would allow all
parties to avoid litigating these decisions in courts, which could result in
prolonged unwanted medical treatment. 215 Having clear legal procedures to
follow is especially important to ensure physicians’ personal biases do not
influence their judgments about the best course of action and to protect them
from civil or criminal liability if they choose to withdraw lifesaving
treatment. 216
Though in the ideal scenario women will clarify in their advance health
care directives what their end-of-life wishes would be in the case of

211
GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 6, 7 (“One of the biggest problems with pregnancy exclusions
is that there is virtually no public awareness that they even exist, in part because there is no uniformity in
the way in which pregnancy exclusion clauses are written into state statutes and they often appear under
ambiguous or unrelated titles.”).
212
See Letter from Katherine S. Kohari, supra note 54.
213
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 327E-7(e) (1999) (“A health-care provider may decline to comply
with an individual instruction or health-care decision for reasons of conscience.”); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 41-41-215(5) (1999) (“A health-care provider may decline to comply with an individual instruction or
health-care decision for reasons of conscience.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(k)(1) (2007) (“An attending
physician may decline to honor a declaration that expresses a desire of the declarant that life-prolonging
measures not be used if doing so would violate that physician’s conscience . . . .”).
214
See GREENE & WOLFE, supra note 54, at 4 (explaining that courts must determine how to proceed
in states with no pregnancy exclusion laws, which may result in a pregnant woman being “forced to
endure prolonged treatment—for weeks or even months—before the provisions of her advance directive
can be carried out”); Schwager, supra note 30, at 606 (arguing that states’ living will statutes that are
silent on pregnancy create ambiguity that “breeds reliance on the courts which results in delays” because
a woman in a vegetative state “may be forced to endure prolonged life sustaining treatment against her
wishes, while the Court decides whether or not her advanced directive may be carried out”).
215
See id.
216
See Schwager, supra note 30, at 598 (“[A]dvance directives ideally prevent the need for family
members or health care providers to go to court or have to otherwise resolve treatment disputes that may
arise . . . and allow[] medical staff to act accordingly without fear of repercussion.”); Villarreal supra
note 23, at 1058 (“Both families and medical providers want to avoid going to court to litigate end-of-life
care decisions, and doctors want to ensure that they will be protected from civil or criminal liability if
they forgo certain medical procedures.”).
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pregnancy, the law must properly address situations in which they have not
done so. There are three situations that must be addressed separately with
regard to reforming pregnancy exclusion laws: (1) where a woman has
advance directives that clearly communicate her wishes in the case of
pregnancy; (2) where a woman has advance directives that direct removal of
life-sustaining treatment but do not clarify her wishes in the case of
pregnancy; and (3) where a woman does not have any advance directives at
all indicating her wishes on whether to sustain or remove life support. 217
A. Advance Directives Communicating Wishes in the Case of Pregnancy
If a woman clearly communicates that her end-of-life wishes in the case
of pregnancy are to remove life support, then state law should honor those
wishes if the fetus is not viable. 218 This means physicians should follow
directives to remove life-sustaining treatment—allowing the patient to die a
natural death and the fetus to die as a byproduct of the medical decision.219
Respecting this decision pre-viability would be consistent with the right to
terminate a pregnancy without an undue burden under Casey, and even after
viability would be consistent with the right to refuse lifesaving medical
treatment under Cruzan. Accordingly, the states that currently have laws that
force a physician to void a pregnant woman’s advance directives 220—even
when the woman states her wishes in the case of pregnancy—should take
immediate action to reform their statutes in line with the above constitutional
rights.
If a pregnant woman’s fetus is viable, a decision must be made about
whether to induce birth since the fetus can survive outside the mother’s
womb, or whether to continue life support to let the fetus further develop. In
that scenario, the physician should inform the woman’s health care agent of
all the relevant bioethical considerations and medical risks of prolonged
treatment. These considerations would then guide the proxy in deciding
217
See Manninen, supra note 181, at 407 (explaining that these three scenarios pose different ethical
dilemmas).
218
See id. at 409 (“If a pregnant woman has exercised her prospective autonomy to explicitly state
that she does not want her body artificially sustained if she were to become brain-dead, even in the event
of pregnancy, then her wishes should be respected to the same extent that her bodily autonomy takes
precedence over the fetal interest in continued existence while she is living.”).
219
See id.
220
The states that do not respect advance directives that clarify one’s wishes in the case of pregnancy
include Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and
Wisconsin. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(e) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4510 (2019); IND. CODE § 16-364-8(d) (West 2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 103(a)(4)(B) (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 700.5512(1)
(2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.025 (2018); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 62-5-507 (2018); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-123(1) (2018); WIS. STAT. § 154.03(2)
(2018).
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whether the woman would want the physician to induce birth through a
cesarean section, whether to keep the mother on life support to allow the
fetus to further develop so it can be born with less risk, 221 or whether the
health risks are so high as to justify removing treatment despite the
consequences for the fetus. Thus, in the case of a viable pregnancy, the
woman’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment under Cruzan would be
delegated to her health care proxy who would be able to make an informed
decision on her behalf about inducing birth or refusing further treatment.
B. Advance Directives Without Clarifying in the Case of Pregnancy
If a pregnant woman in a persistent vegetative state does not clarify in
her advance directives what her end-of-life wishes would be in the case of
pregnancy, but does state that her wish is to remove life-sustaining treatment,
state law should not immediately void the advance directives. Instead, the
law should impose a presumption that the woman would want to refuse
medical treatment even with her current pregnancy. This presumption to
refuse medical treatment, despite the woman’s pregnancy, could then be
overcome by presenting evidence that the woman would have changed her
mind if she knew she would be pregnant at the time that a decision regarding
suspension of life support must be made. Though the details of such a
proposal should be worked out by state legislatures working with physicians
to determine exactly what this would entail, such evidence could include
OBGYN visits, any previous conversations regarding pregnancy or childbearing, and other similar considerations that would help shed light on the
woman’s likely intent. 222 By imposing a presumption instead of immediately
delegating the decision to the woman’s health care agent or family members,
the law is more likely to honor the woman’s dignity and desires.
C. No Advance Directives
Finally, if a pregnant woman in a persistent vegetative state does not
have advance health care directives expressing whether she would want to
be sustained on life support, the decision should be delegated to the patient’s

See Manninen, supra note 181, at 409 (“The [viable] fetus, therefore should be sustained for the
handful of weeks it would take to bring it to sufficient maturity so that it can be born with minimal
[e]ffects to its health.”).
222
See id. at 410 (“For example, if a pregnant cadaver belonged to a woman who knew about her
pregnancy and embraced it, and who had in the past expressed a moral or religious objection to
terminating fetal life, one could reasonably conclude that she would have conceded to the continual
gestation of the fetus, even in absence of any clear directive, because this seems consistent with her
preferences and values.”).
221
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health care agent. 223 The health care proxy is the best party to make the
decision because they are likely most familiar with the pregnant woman’s
wishes and desires, whereas a physician probably lacks such insight. 224 To
guide the woman’s health care agent in making an informed decision about
whether to remove or sustain lifesaving treatment, the woman’s physicians
should inform those parties of bioethical considerations and medical risks.
CONCLUSION
Although cases of pregnant women in persistent vegetative states are
exceedingly rare, when possible the law should seek to preserve the woman’s
wishes and respect her autonomy in deciding whether to continue lifesustaining treatment to develop the fetus. Because all current state pregnancy
exclusion laws either violate constitutional rights or fall short of today’s
bioethical norms, it is imperative for states to reform their respective statutes
to be both constitutional and ethical. A presumption model is the most
appropriate framework for a state statute because it passes constitutional
muster and respects the pregnant woman’s autonomy—in situations where
she would have continued life support and in situations where she would not.
Given the glaring lack of notice about the existence of pregnancy exclusion
laws, it is critical that women learn how the current pregnancy exclusion law
in their state could have horrifying consequences for themselves, and
ultimately call on lawmakers to adopt a constitutional and ethical solution.

This situation is particularly important to consider because many pregnant women are fairly young
and may not have contemplated executing a living will. See Villarreal, supra note 23, at 1063.
224
This may not be true in all situations, such as where the patient is estranged from her family or
even in an abusive relationship with her health care proxy. However, family and friends who are likely
to be health care proxies are generally better positioned than a health care provider to exercise substitute
decision-making in deciding what the woman would have wanted. Timothy J. Burch, Incubator or
Individual?: The Legal and Policy Deficiencies of Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will and Advance Health
Care Directive Statutes, 54 MD. L. REV. 528, 569–70 (1995).
223
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1

Level of
Restrictiveness

Void Per Se

Count

10

States
Kansas
Michigan
Missouri
South Carolina

Texas
Utah
Wisconsin

Pennsylvania
New Hampshire

Alabama
Idaho
Indiana
Probable Development
Alaska
Delaware
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
Rhode Island

Kentucky

New Jersey
Vermont
Washington

Unless Reasonable
Medical Certainty That a
Fetus Could Not Be Born

11

North Dakota
South Dakota

Connecticut
Georgia
Maryland

Possible
Development

5

Arizona
Oklahoma
Florida

2

Void Unless an Ethical
Condition Is Met a

9

Colorado
Mississippi
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

Oregon
Tennessee
Virginia
West Virginia
Wyoming

Ohio

3
Void Unless the Woman
Specifically States “In the
Case of Pregnancy”

1

Void if the Fetus Can
Develop to Birth at Some
Level of Certainty

4

Honor If Pregnant, Unless
the Fetus Is Viable

14

Arkansas
Illinois
Iowa
Minnesota

5

States with No Pregnancy
Exclusion Law

California
Hawaii
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts

That is, physical harm to the woman or severe pain that cannot be alleviated by medication.
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